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ABSTRACT
Ho↵man, Kevin J. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Ribbons: A Partially
Shared Memory Programming Model. Major Professor: Patrick Eugster.
The need for programs to execute subcomponents in isolation from each other or
with lower privileges is prevalent among today’s systems. While modern operating
systems provide mechanisms for fine-grained isolation of OS resources, only course-
grained mechanisms exist for e cient isolation of heap memory. This dissertation
develops a new memory programming model known as ribbons to enable fine-grained
isolation of heap memory. Ribbons is a shared memory programming model that al-
lows for more implicit sharing of memory than multiprocessing yet is more restrictive
than multithreading. The ribbons model hierarchically structures the heap into pro-
tection domains. Privileges between these protection domains are carefully controlled
in order to “sandbox” computation as needed.
To allow practical use of the model in new and existing programs, this dissertation
defines a backwards-compatible extension of Java, termed RibbonJ. The progress
and isolation properties of RibbonJ are analyzed within a simplified formal model.
Additionally, ribbons is implemented within JikesRVM, leveraging existing hardware
memory protection mechanisms to avoid the overhead of inline security checks and
read or write barriers. Runtime e ciency is evaluated through microbenchmarks and
the DaCapo benchmarks, exhibiting minor overhead. This dissertation also studies
ribbons further by refactoring Apache Tomcat and Apache httpd. Apache Tomcat is
refactored to use RibbonJ for application isolation, the resulting design and complex-
ity are detailed, and performance is evaluated using the SPECweb2009 benchmark.
Finally, Apache httpd is enhanced with a ribbonized multiprocessing module, and
performance is analyzed via the Apache HTTP benchmarking tool, ab.
11 INTRODUCTION
The need for programs to execute subcomponents in isolation from each other or with
lower privileges is prevalent among today’s systems. While modern operating systems
provide mechanisms for fine-grained isolation of OS resources, only course-grained
mechanisms exist for e cient isolation of heap memory. This dissertation develops
and evaluates a new memory programming model known as ribbons to enable fine-
grained isolation of heap memory. Ribbons is a shared memory programming model
that allows for more implicit sharing of memory than multiprocessing yet is more
restrictive than multithreading. The ribbons model hierarchically structures the heap
into protection domains. Privileges between these protection domains are carefully
controlled in order to “sandbox” computation as needed.
1.1 Processes
Processes and threads are foundational elements of computing. A process in a
modern operating system (OS) models an instance of an executing program and
all of the computing resources in use by the executing program. Processes allow
multiple programs and users to share common computing resources, such as memory,
processors (e.g., CPUs), peripherals, and storage, subject to the constraints setup by
the operating system and its administrators.
The process is typically the smallest unit whereby other processes and users man-
age what is running inside the operating system. One process is not (typically)
directly aware of the internal specifics of another process, such as memory segment
locations, specific threads of execution, or file handle values. Operating systems pro-
vide explicit interprocess communication (IPC) mechanisms, such as shared memory
2regions, FIFO pipes, and sockets, to allow processes to coordinate execution with
each other and with processes on remote systems through structured, well-defined
mechanisms.
Processes also provide fault isolation whereby the erroneous actions of one process
cannot directly cause another process to fail (provided that one process is not directly
modifying the internal details of another process, which is normally the case). This
provides an important mechanism for system stability in the presence of multiple
(potentially untrusted) users.
1.2 Virtual Memory
Virtual memory is a key element in isolating processes from each other by provid-
ing each process the illusion that it has full control over the entire addressable mem-
ory address space of the computer, whereas in reality there is only a finite amount
of memory and one physical address for each addressable word of memory. Virtual
memory addresses are translated on demand into physical addresses through careful
cooperation between the operating system and the underlying CPUs. Modern CPU
architectures enable e cient implementation of virtual memory mechanisms through
hardware support for hierarchical page tables, translation look-aside bu↵ers (TLBs),
multi-level caches, cache coherency protocols, and “traps” that enable the OS to
programatically respond to exceptional conditions.
Such memory isolation features of VMM work in tandem with protection ring
features of CPUs, which allow programs to execute in di↵erent security contexts
such that changes to key OS and CPU data structures, such as VMM isolation and
sharing information, can be structured and controlled. The “kernel” is the part of the
operating system that operates with the highest security privileges and is responsible
for ensuring secure and e cient execution of all processes while mediating access to
shared resources according to the desired policies. Recently hardware virtualization
mechanisms such as Intel VT-x and AMD-V provide even another layer of abstraction,
3allowing hypervisors to coordinate, control, and mediate the execution of multiple
operating system kernels and the overlying processes they support.
Beyond providing isolation, virtual memory management (VMM) supports many
features in modern operating systems, such as shared memory segments, memory-
mapped file I/O, and zero-copy inter-layer communication functions. With shared
memory segments, two (or more) processes can share the same logical segment of
memory, even if each process uses a di↵erent addressing scheme in accessing the same
logical (or physical) segment of memory.
1.3 Threads
Threads are additional instances of computation within a process that share the
same virtual memory address space and other OS resources as their parent process.
Threads enable a single program to concurrently implement its desired logic in a
shared-everything model, unlike other concurrency mechanisms such as message pass-
ing (shared-nothing). Although shared-memory multithreading comes with its own
set of challenges, multithreading has become a popular method for implementing
concurrent programs.
1.4 Multi-core Computing and Plugin Architectures
Furthermore, advances in computing power have shifted from increasing serial
execution speed via frequency scaling to increasing parallelism. This is for instance
demonstrated in an impressive manner by Intel’s recent 80-core Teraflops Research
Chip [57], which fits an entire supercomputer onto a single chip.
While the multi-core computing paradigm is here to stay, the e↵ects of the un-
derlying shift from serial to concurrent programming and the resulting challenges are
just beginning to be experienced by both consumers and programmers alike. In order
4to capitalize on the ever-increasing raw computing capacities, serious challenges to
more programmable, scalable, reliable, and secure computing must be overcome.
Additionally, programmers at large are finding the transition to parallel computing
di cult. Parallelism introduces several new classes of bugs, including deadlocks, live-
locks, and data races, which are often subtle and hard to reproduce. These problems
are magnified further by the varying underlying memory models and the ambiguities
that exist therein [70]. Although many viable proposals exist for more elegant and safe
parallel programming (e.g. languages that tightly restrict shared mutable state [8]),
these often require programmers to tackle problems in radically di↵erent ways, and
are not well-suited for the parallelization of existing codebases. New methodologies
are needed that simplify the inherent complexity within parallel systems without
forcing programmers to radically abandon existing models they know and trust.
Another trend is that many applications are composed of a “mash-up” of compo-
nents from various untrusted sources. Such applications need the ability to execute
subcomponents with lower privileges or in (partial) isolation from each other to en-
force security requirements. Web servers, application servers, and web browsers allow
for embedded execution of third-party subcomponents such as plugins, which are
often targets of exploitation.
While modern operating systems provide a rich set of features for fine-grained pro-
tection of various OS resources (e.g., access control mechanisms on files and SELinux
policies), even at the thread level, no mechanisms are provided for fine-grained intra-
process memory isolation.
1.5 Memory Isolation Mechanisms
The need for modern applications to isolate sub-components has become prevelant,
and over the last two decades this need has led to diverse strategies to provide such
5isolation. This section reviews the major classes of isolation techniques and the
foundational and recent work within each class of technique.
1.5.1 Hardware-based Fine-grained Memory Access Control
Many proposals for fine- and course-grained memory protection with hardware
modifications have recently appeared, including Mondrian [114,115], Legba [113], In-
foShield [97], and others [27,68,94,121]. These systems only provide protection mech-
anisms at the very lowest level, and do not address how to easily program within such
a model. Additionally, they require hardware modifications and can currently only be
used and evaluated within simulations. Capability-based access-control mechanisms,
such as [31, 88, 111], are not suitable for protecting memory regions as they can be
shared in an unrestricted fashion across threads.
The implementation strategy for lightweight protection domains in Nooks [103]
and others [29, 46, 68, 104, 112] utilize page table manipulation and/or hardware seg-
mentation already implemented in existing commodity hardware. Nooks focused on
error detection and recovery of device drivers, and had a static structure of protec-
tion domains designed for separating kernel modules. While e↵ective for its targeted
purpose, the protection domains and corresponding privileges are fixed in these sys-
tems, and so are not easily extensible into a more general model that is dynamically
adaptable at runtime.
1.5.2 Guarding Against Heap Corruption and Memory Bugs
Hardware-based [38,87,96,108,123] and software-based [2, 4, 5, 9, 28,61–63,89,92]
techniques have been proposed for guarding against heap corruption and memory
bugs. These techniques target specific types of bugs and attacks and do not provide
a general-purpose protection model. Also, they either do not distinguish between
6threads in a process [38,62,87,89,96] or are based solely on temporal constraints [28,
108,123]. All hardware-based techniques except [87] require hardware modifications.
1.5.3 Region-based Memory Allocation
Region-based memory management has been investigated in various programming
paradigms, e.g., functional [105], imperative [53]. The main driving force is to avoid
costly heap allocation and garbage collection overheads, which is achieved by intro-
ducing some structure into the memory such as to deallocate entire regions in single
steps. However, region-based memory management approaches force rigid hierarchi-
cal organizational patterns on the heap whose lifetime is tied to code scope, and
provide no protection features – only improved performance.
1.5.4 Ownership Types
Ownership types [15, 16, 30] and derivates are a corresponding attempt to control
the e↵ects of aliasing in object settings, by limiting accesses to objects to their owners.
These are objects themselves, which are given certain access rights on the former
objects, while these rights are denied to others, leading to a rigid hierarchical structure
of the heap. Recent research has focused on greater flexibility by separating read and
write accesses [39, 69] or through multiple ownership [20] or ownership transfer [78].
However, ownership types require annotating every object and are thus burdensome.
Also, the static enforcement of access rules is quite restrictive because communication
patterns are fixed statically by type – di↵erent threads acting in di↵erent roles may
not access the same type di↵erently. Furthermore, ownership types cannot guard
against malicious compilers and cannot protect low-level system components.
71.5.5 Code Rewriting, Inline Monitors, and Language-based Techniques
Pure software techniques based on code rewriting [23, 43, 46, 71, 73, 110, 117], in-
line monitors [2, 4, 5, 43, 61], and static enforcement through typing or other lan-
guage features [3, 11, 19, 54, 60, 66, 74, 77, 101, 109] have been proposed and show
promise for e cient enforcement of fine-grained protection mechanisms. Code rewrit-
ing and inline monitors rely on either a trusted rewriter or a trusted static verifier
to ensure correctness. Additionally, these techniques either have fixed protection
domains [23, 73, 110, 117] or require slow paths with excessive overheads (2x to 8x
slowdown as observed in [43]), and may be highly architecture specific, as was the
case with [110]. Language-based techniques cannot typically protect the entire op-
erating system, as protection is provided via safe language semantics, and certain
system components must be written in unsafe languages. Recent work has made
progress towards entire operating systems being written in type safe languages with
isolation being enforced by type safety and other language semantics, for example
Singularity [58] or Verve [116].
Cloneable JVM [60] attempts to mitigate the cost of isolating subcomponents in
Java programs by allowing a running JVM to be cloned in a post-initialized state.
However, applications running withing cloned JVMs are fully isolated and must com-
municate with its parent JVM only through slower IPC mechanisms.
JavaSeal [19] allowed code, data, and a security policy to be bundled together into
a mobile agent, which could then execute on any Java platform and environment with
guaranteed enforcement of the bundled security policy and corresponding behavior.
In this model, a mobile agent must be isolated from the application invoking the
mobile agent (as well as from other mobile agents), and the application must only
interact through the mobile agent through the mobile agent’s well defined interface.
All interaction occurs through a well defined message passing mechanism and not via
sharing references to objects.
8Object Spaces [18] places Java objects into distinct object spaces. Rather than
attempting to control access to object references themselves, enforcement of a security
policy is made when an object belonging to one object space calls a method on
an object belonging to a separate object space. The security model is enforced at
runtime via generated proxy objects termed “bridge objects” that wrap each real
object instance.
1.5.6 Software Fault Isolation
Software fault isolation (SFI) [29,99,110] isolates di↵erent software modules within
a shared address space by loading the code and data for di↵erent modules into their
own distinct fault domains and then rewriting loaded code to prevent the code from
modifying data outside of the associated fault domain or jumping to code outside
of the fault domain. While some code instructions can be statically verified to not
violate the constraints (e.g., absolute jump instructions), others must be verified at
runtime through checks inserted prior to any “unsafe” instructions. Alternatively,
instead of check operations, a technique termed “address sandboxing” can be used
where instructions can be inserted prior to unsafe instructions that force the relevant
bits of the addresses used by the following unsafe instruction to be within the address
range for the associated fault domain. On some instruction set architectures address
sandboxing requires fewer instructions with smaller encodings as compared to check
instructions, thus resulting in smaller pressure on the CPU’s instruction cache.
Software fault isolation also guards access to OS resources by transforming code
that makes system calls to instead make calls through a trusted mediator. Calls to
the trusted mediator are made by placing trusted “trampoline” code in a dedicated
read-only section of the address space, and then allowing control flow operations to
escape the current fault domain only by calling or jumping to code in this trusted
address space. The trampoline code has full privileges to make actual system calls
– it will perform (or transfer to code that performs) any desired security checks on
9the requested operation based on the calling fault domain and then completes the
operation and returns control flow to the calling fault domain.
The granularity of software fault isolation has been improved to even the byte-
level [23], providing a logical association of an access control list and a type for each
byte in memory. Such features were provided through compiler enhancements that
adjust data layouts and e ciently enforce ACL checks inline (less than 15% overhead
for the scenarios tested). However, such techniques require custom compilation at the
source code, or requires binary code that has full debugging symbols. Additionally,
the techniques that make it e cient are specific to the context of device drivers where
there is a limited number of fault domains and where usually each byte of memory
only has one entry in its corresponding ACL.
Pure software fault isolation typically only sandboxes data writes and control
flow transfer, it does not prevent code from reading data outside of the current fault
domain due to the overhead of guarding all read operations instead of just write and
control flow operations. Certain modern software fault isolation designs [29, 46, 117]
leverage a combination of code verification, code rewriting, and hardware isolation
features such as segmentation or paging to deliver e cient read isolation as well.
Palladium [29] leverages ring levels, segmentation, and paging features of the x86
architecture to isolate kernel modules or di↵erent user modules from each other.
However, in Palladium fault isolation boundaries are fixed at the module level into a
single privileged vs unprivileged fault domain hierarchy.
Native client [117] combines software fault isolation techniques with x86 hardware
segmentation to achieve e cient read, write, control flow, and resource sandboxing
of components. On the x86 architecture, specific CISC features such as variable-
length instruction coding, self-modifying code, and indirect jumps prevent reliable
disassembly. For example, if code jumps to a location that is in the middle of a
multi-byte instruction, this would result in an alternate sequence of instructions that
may be di↵erent than what a normal sequential disassembly would have produced.
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Native client addresses these challenges through compiler adjustments that ensure
any control flow transfer are made only onto aligned 32-byte boundaries and then
through a small, trusted code validator that verifies these and other constraints on all
loaded code. Self-modifying code is also restricted by restricting writes to any code
segment via OS page-level protection mechanisms.
Performance is improved compared to pure software isolation because isolation on
data operations is achieved through hardware segmentation rather than inline checks,
with 5% observed overhead being typical. Control flow integrity is also simplified by
relying on segmentation to constrain jumps only to locations within the same code
segment (within the same fault domain). All indirect jumps are verified to only jump
to aligned 32-byte boundaries, and thus only jumping to a location whose disassembly
sequence is proven to already have been verified by the code validator. Direct jumps
can be validated by inspection of the target location by the code validator.
Native client has been enhanced to also support other CPU architectures, in-
cluding amd64 and ARM [93]. These architectures do not support the segmentation
features required by the x86 native client design, and thus for these architectures
native client implements data (stores only) and control flow isolation through address
sandboxing, as is used in SFI originally. Although average observed overhead was
only 7%, on some specific benchmarks observed overhead exceeded 25%.
The security of the trusted portion of the native client design, the code validator,
has been improved substantially by having the implementation be automatically gen-
erated from a declarative model formally proven against a significant subset of the
x86 instruction set via the Coq proof assistant [76]. The technique reduces the size
of the trusted code base from around 600 C statements that directly disassemble the
x86 instruction stream to just 10 C statements that implement table-based transition
logic for a finite state machine.
Recent work has leveraged the native client SFI design to provide software fault
isolation features for the Java JVM: Robusta [98] uses native client to isolate execution
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of JNI native code. Robusta also enforces several additional isolation constraints
specific to the JVM, including mediating access to OS resources through the Java
Security Manager and enforcing the Java object reachability graph (e.g., preventing
reads of private fields). Robusta enhances native client to support dynamic loading
of modules (which is how JNI code is loaded within the JVM). However, Robusta
only provides two fault domains – one domain for the JVM and one domain for JNI
native code. Additionally, the observed overhead of switching between these fault
domains was quite high, causing a 7x slowdown in specific cases where code was
rapidly switching between Java code and JNI native code.
Arabica [102] builds on the Robusta design to improve JVM portability by imple-
menting JNI native code isolation through a combination of a custom JVMTI agent
and custom dynamic library stubs that intercept all inbound calls to loaded native
JNI libraries. Arabica also allows for isolating a subset of the native code that imple-
ments a JVM’s support for the Java standard class library. With a significant portion
of the standard class library using native code isolation, observed overheads on the
SPECjvm 2008 benchmark were often less than 10%, but was as high as 112%. As
with Robusta, only two fault domains are provided.
The primary limitation of almost all software fault isolation systems, includ-
ing [7, 23,43,73,93,98,99,102,106,110,117], is that fault domains are statically fixed
and bound to particular sections of code. The same region of code (e.g., a library)
is not able to execute in the context of di↵erent fault domains. A recent SFI im-
plementation by Mao et al. [71] allows multiple fault domains to be instantiated at
runtime; however, these fault domains are still fixed to fault domain classes defined
at compile time, and the observed slowdown was 30%. Additionally, this technique
does not provide read sandboxing.
Erlingsson et al. [7] implement support for SFI in language runtimes that employ
techniques that modify code at runtime, including just-in-time (JIT) compilation
and on-stack code replacement (OSR). The work enhances the native client design to
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allow code to safely be added, modified, or deleted at runtime from fault domains,
even in the presence of concurrency. The design was implemented within two modern
language runtimes: Mono (CLR (.NET)) and V8 (JavaScript). Typical observed
overheads on benchmarks ranged from 1% (x86 platform within Mono) to 60% (x86-
64 within Mono and all platforms within V8), but were as high as 196%. Although
code regions can dynamically be added, modified, or deleted, this work does not solve
the limitation that a particular section of code is always associated with a particular
fault domain. Additionally, the x86-64 implementation does not provide sandboxing
of reads.
1.5.7 Specialized or Enhanced Operating Systems
Opal [24] is an OS providing features for processes with partially-shared memory
address spaces. However, Opal requires a single system-wide shared virtual address
space, and also does not model the memory allocation privilege, which is important
both for security and for allocation optimization. Opal’s dynamic grant and deny
segmentation model is potentially less secure (via accidental capability leakage via
bugs or manipulation) and prevents analysis of programs for automatic parallelization.
Others [34, 36, 37,90] have similar limitations.
Fluke [47] is a specialized OS designed to provide “recursive virtual machines” –
Fluke redefines the services provided by a kernel so that all provided resources to a
child kernel are relative to the containing parent kernel. These abstractions are then
mapped down to “flat” structures that a typical OS uses to provide such functionality.
For example, instead of allowing kernels full access over the physical address space of a
computer’s memory, a kernel has access to a “view” of memory relative to the view of
its parent kernel. For a particular process living within a particular recursive virtual
machine, Fluke will then flatten all of the relative memory views of that process into
an actual page table mapping virtual memory to physical memory. This provides an
e cient nested isolation model for both OS kernels and processes.
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Wedge [12] is an enhanced Linux OS that provides sthreads, which are program
threads that execute with no privileges on heap memory by default, and can then be
granted fine-grained access to a program’s memory. Memory resources are assigned
a memory tag at allocation. All blocks of memory with the same memory tag are
considered to be within the same protection domain. An access policy indicates the
set of privileges (read or read/write) an sthread should have over memory associated
with certain memory tags. Callgates control the transfer of control between sthreads,
allowing escalation and de-escalation or privileges. An sthread cannot create a more
privileged callgate, but an sthread can authorize a more restricted sthread to use a
callgate that it has created. Wedge implements a strict sandboxing model where an
sthread can only spawn child sthreads with the same or fewer privileges.
In Wedge, enforcement is implemented within the OS kernel by treating each
sthread as a separate process and modifying the page table entries of an sthread
so that it only has the appropriate privileges over a subset of its parent process as
determined by its access policy. Despite this e cient enforcement mechanism, the
overhead introduced by callgates caused the sthread-enhanced Apache server to have
30% to 45% reduced throughput in their benchmark. Observed overhead for the
sthread-enhanced OpenSSH server was negligible (2%).
Specialized operating systems that provide data flow isolation policies have emerged,
including Asbestos [107], HiStar [120], and Flume [67]. Data flow isolation focuses
on protecting the confidentiality or privacy of data, and is complementary to systems
that enforce memory access privileges based on code location or other code-contextual
information (such as the running thread).
1.5.8 Virtualization
While virtualizing entire operating systems is too heavyweight a mechanism to vir-
tualize di↵erent sub-components within a single application, many of the same prin-
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ciples and implementation techniques have been leveraged to provide lighter weight
isolation semantics [10, 17, 32,32,40,47, 83,84].
Tahoma [32] focuses on isolating web applications from each other and from the
web browser by leveraging hardware virtualization to run distinct web browser in-
stances as separate hardware VMs. All communication of a browser instance within
a VM with the network and with other browser instances is mediated by the trusted
browser operating system, which enforces the desired security policies.
Dune [10] leverages CPU hardware virtualization features to allow user-level OS
processes to run separate code at di↵erent CPU protection ring levels. This allows
user-space processes to employ ring-based isolation mechanisms to enforce access
policies over memory or OS resources (as all system calls of code running in a less
privileged ring will be intercepted by the user-level code running at virtualized ring
level 0).
Apiary [84] provides application-level isolation containers that fully virtualizes the
display and filesystem resources of an application. Applications run within a fully
virtualized process container, such that to the application it appears that it is the
only application running and that it has full control over OS resources. Apiary’s
virtualized filesystem implementation provides copy-on-write semantics, which allows
even large applications with complex data requirements to be quickly virtualized
without heavy startup costs. Interaction between isolated application containers is
carefully controlled according to the defined system security policy, mitigating the
impact of any hacked application.
Xax [40] is similar in goals to Apiary in that it allows native code to run in a fully
isolated environment with carefully defined interaction boundaries with the host OS.
However, in this case the isolation is provided by defining a custom application binary
interface (ABI) that Xax applications are compiled against. Xax then implements this
ABI so that the application appears to the outside world as a web server running an
interactive HTML/JavaScript application. Thus, all interaction between the isolated
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application and the host OS occurs through the well defined interface of a web browser
communicating with the Xax web server, which then communicates through the Xax
ABI with the isolated application.
1.6 Component Isolation in Apache Tomcat
To further motivate the need for intra-process isolation, consider the case of how
component isolation is implemented within Apache Tomcat, an open-source imple-
mentation of the Java Servlet and Java Server Pages (JSP) technologies. Tomcat
allows multiple web applications and related components to run in isolation from
other each other within the same Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Executing compo-
nents (servlets, JSPs, tag libraries, etc.) are isolated so that they can not interfere
either with the operation of the main Tomcat server nor with other running compo-
nents. Tomcat enforces isolation through two mechanisms: (a) a separate class loader
for each web application, and (b) the Java Security Manager [35], an access monitor
enforcing isolation boundaries upon JVM properties, files and directories, networking,
and reflection. Using separate class loaders prevents a web application from accessing
Tomcat’s internals or other applications’ state, only allowing applications to interact
with the host server code through certain classes loaded by the global class loader.
Class loaders achieve this isolation by copying loaded classes and giving them names
which are logically distinct across loaders. The normal type-safety mechanisms in the
JVM thus enforce isolation between uses of a class loaded by di↵erent class loaders.
This mechanism, however, is subject to vulnerabilities through bugs in classes
loaded by Tomcat’s global class loader (CVE-2009-07831). The bug allows a web
application to escape isolation by replacing Tomcat’s XML parser at runtime, allowing
a malicious application to read sensitive files of other applications (e.g., containing
passwords). The complexity of Tomcat’s ad-hoc isolation mechanisms makes it hard
to verify that any given version is 100% correct and remains so as the code evolves.
1http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0783
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In contrast, another approach is to run each isolated component in a separate
language virtual machine or process. This strategy is used by the Chromium and
Firefox web browsers, which execute tabs and plugins in distinct processes. These
techniques induce runtime overhead due to increased memory usage (e.g., extra copies
of objects) and IPC between tabs and the main process (e.g., remote method invo-
cations if using something like Isolates [33, 55]). IPC also increases code complexity.
Specific solutions such as browser isolation mechanisms [25] cannot easily be applied
to other cases such as application servers, or even related plugin architectures such
as integrated development environments (e.g., Eclipse).
1.7 Thesis Statement
The thesis of this dissertation is that existing hardware virtual memory and oper-
ating system mechanisms can be leveraged to provide an e cient programming model
wherein multiple instances of computation within a process only partially share mem-
ory resources, as structured by fine-grained access control privileges defined by the
application.
This work will develop and evaluate the ribbons programming model, which en-
ables the heaps of subcomponents within a process to be fully or partially isolated
in well-structured ways. The heap is divided into an arbitrary and dynamic number
of protection domains. Access privileges are tracked pair-wise between protection do-
mains, and threads are grouped into ribbons. Ribbons subsume threads, and help
protect against inadvertent or malicious access to data and mitigate unbounded heap
corruption in unsafe runtime environments. Enforcement during execution relies on




This dissertation contributes the following:
• A definition of the ribbons programming model.
• RibbonJ, a Java language extension, for writing programs using the ribbons
model.
• RibbonJ-lite, a formalism for RibbonJ’s core, to study progress and isolation
properties.
• An evaluation of an implementation ofRibbonJ in JikesRVM, using microbench-
marks and the DaCapo benchmarks [14].
• A case study wherein Apache Tomcat is refactored to isolate web applications
using ribbons.
• An evaluation of a ribbonized version of Apache httpd using the ab benchmark-
ing tool.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 details the
ribbon model and its concepts in RibbonJ. A subset of RibbonJ is formalized in
Chapter 3 and analyzes isolation and progress properties. Chapter 4 presents an im-
plementation of RibbonJ in JikesRVM. Chapter 5 evaluates performance character-
istics through benchmarks, and also presents a ribbonization of Tomcat, discusses re-
quired code changes, and evaluates performance di↵erences; this chapter also presents
a new version of Apache httpd with a ribbonized multiprocessing module and studies
performance di↵erences through benchmarks. Chapter 6 presents conclusions and
discusses future work.
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2 PROTECTION DOMAINS, RIBBONS, AND RIBBONJ
In this section the ribbons memory programming model is defined, as well as Rib-
bonJ, a backwards-compatible extension of Java that provides the features of the
ribbons model.
2.1 Ribbons Memory Programming Model
The ribbons model defines three abstractions: protection domains, domain sharing
privileges, and actual ribbons. Protection domains are the basic unit from which
memory sharing constraints are formed. All memory allocations are associated with
some protection domain (implicitly or explicitly), such that each area of memory
allocated (and thus each object in object-oriented languages) is placed “within” that
domain.
Every thread in a program is associated with one or more protection domains,
which determines its set of privileges as follows: Domain sharing privileges specify
the access that threads executing within the context of one protection domain (termed
the source domain) have on memory contained within some other protection domain
(target domain). A privilege is composed of a source domain identifier SD, a target
domain identifier TD, and any number of the following permissions:
read: Domain SD can read memory in domain TD.
write: Domain SD can write memory in domain TD.
inject: Domain SD can allocate memory in domain TD.
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Finally, a ribbon is a set of protection domains that models the assignment of
threads to sets of protection domains. Creating a new ribbon also creates a new thread
that is associated with a new set of existing protection domains (programmatically
specified). This thread and all threads that it spawns execute within the context of
these protection domains. Once created, the set of domain sharing privileges for a
ribbon cannot be changed. The privileges acquired by a ribbon upon creation are
upper bounded by the privileges of the ribbon of the creating thread. This ensures
that once sharing constraints are placed upon a newly created ribbon, all future
computation resulting directly or indirectly from that ribbon will never violate the
sharing constraints.
In summary, the model of execution is modified so that a process contains one or
more ribbons, and a ribbon contains one or more threads. Threads spawned within
a ribbon share their enclosing ribbon’s set of protection domains. Upon process
creation, a new ribbon is created, and thereby a new thread. Programs that are
unaware of ribbons operate as before, as they are contained within a single ribbon,
and all threads share the same protection domain.
2.2 Privileges Between Domains vs. Privileges Between a Ribbon and a Domain
An explicit design choice was made to model a privilege as a relationship between
a source domain and a target domain rather than between a source ribbon and a target
domain. Data structures model both (a) the information contained in the structure
itself, and (b) the relationships between di↵erent data structures. In the same way,
protection domains model both (a) the kind of information contained in the protection
domain (as determined by the way in which a program allocates information into
a protection domain), and (b) the allowed security relationships between di↵erent
protection domains. The protection domain concept is thus a higher-level counterpart
to lower-level data structures that programmers are already familiar with. If privileges
were between a ribbon and a domain, this would rather force the programmer to think
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in terms of both execution context (code/logic) and heap design (data structures) at
the same time.
The two approaches to defining privileges can be shown to be equivalent to each
other, and thus the choice was made to go with the design that has fewer dependencies
between program concepts during the design of the program. The approach where
privileges are defined as a relationship between a source ribbon and a target domain
can be emulated in the model where privileges are between a source domain and a
target domain by having each ribbon be associated with a unique protection domain
and where the privileges of this domain are equivalent to the privileges of the ribbon.
Likewise, the approach where privileges are defined as a relationship between a source
domain and a target domain can be emulated in the model where privileges are
between a source ribbon and a target domain by requiring that a ribbon be associated
with one or more protection domains upon construction, and the privileges of this
created ribbon are equivalent to the privileges of the protection domains it is being
associated with.
2.3 Master–Worker Example
The Master–Worker pattern is common in parallel processing, and consists of a
master delegating tasks to one or more workers through a shared queue. Workers
complete tasks in parallel and report completed tasks back to the master. Figure 2.1
demonstrates how the ribbons model could be used to enforce heap isolation between
workers within the same process. The owner ribbon represents the main program.
The owner ribbon contains its own protection domain, containing the main state of
the program.
The owner ribbon creates a master ribbon, which contains the master protection
domain containing the state needed by the master to create new tasks and post-
process completed tasks. The owner domain (and thus the owner ribbon) has full
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Figure 2.1.: Modeling a master–worker relationship in ribbons.
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this example, the master domain is only given read privileges on the owner domain,
allowing it to read state information needed to create new tasks. A variation of
this design would be to use an intermediary protection domain between the owner
domain and the master domain, so that neither domain has any direct permissions
on the other domain.
The master ribbon creates the queue domain, which is used to contain task infor-
mation, as well as the shared queue for delegation of tasks to Workers. The master is
given full control over the queue domain, enabling the master to create and modify
tasks as needed.
The master ribbon creates one or more worker ribbons. Each worker ribbon has
its own worker domain that is fully isolated from the other worker domains of other
ribbons. Additionally, while worker domains have read and write privileges on the
queue domain (so they can add and remove from the queue of tasks to be processed),
they do not have the inject privilege, so they are unable to directly create additional
new tasks to be processed. The master ribbon does not need full control over the
private worker domains, it only needs read access to easily determine the current
processing status of all workers.
This example demonstrates that not all protection domains need to be bound to
a particular ribbon. Each ribbon is bound to one or more protection domains, and
the immediate privileges of these bound domains determine the ribbon’s heap access
privileges. Note that the heap access privileges are not transitive—the fact that the
owner domain (and thus the owner ribbon) has full control over the master domain
does not also mean that the owner domain has full control over the queue domain.
2.4 Web Browser Example
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2.2 visualizes how these concepts could be applied
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Figure 2.2.: How ribbons could provide heap isolation for components within a web
browser. Note that ribbons for tab #2 and scripts #2 and #3 are not shown. “DOM”
represents the document object model, which is a set of data structures that model
the web page contents.
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risk that must be mitigated within web browsers is the leakage of information–allowing
scripts loaded from one (malicious) website to read the contents of a page loaded from
an unrelated website. For example, a malicious web page trying to read information
downloaded from a bank website, or a malicious web page reading username and
password information submitted to other websites. Guarding against this threat is
made more complicated by the fact that websites might each load the same type of
“plugins” and thus the state between the separate instances of these same plugins
also need to be strongly isolated.
In this example, protection domains are created for each “type” of information that
can be contained within the web browser. Additionally, a hierarchical relationship
is setup between protection domains such that any information from one website
cannot be directly accessed by a domain containing information from a di↵erent
website. Each protection domain is also associated with a ribbon that executes code
relating to managing the information in its associated protection domain. The only
ribbons that have access to information from multiple websites are small sections of
code dedicated to managing multi-page state and can be carefully audited–they do
not contain any code or logic downloaded from remote websites. Certain plugins may
also have the need to provide global shared state between all instances of its plugin,
and again this global state can be carefully managed by a dedicated plugin global
state ribbon.
This example is only concerned with the conceptual design of heap isolation within
a web browser and does not address issues such as plugin crash isolation and recov-
ery [25].
2.5 RibbonJ
RibbonJ is an an extension of Java that implements the ribbon memory pro-
gramming model. Modeling ribbon concepts at the language level o↵ers improved
programmability through type system support and syntactic sugar.
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The protectiondomain keyword is used to define new protection domain types.
These protection domain types represent entire “classes” of protection domains that
may be instantiated at runtime. The type optionally accepts as domain arguments
other typed protection domains. The protectiondomain definition contains a list of
rules that a↵ect privileges when a new domain of that type is created: grant adds a
new privilege where the source domain is explicitly indicated, and the target domain
is the new protection domain; require adds a new privilege where the target domain
is explicitly indicated, and the source domain is the new protection domain. The list
of rules is abstract and is just a policy until an actual protection domain is created
at runtime and concrete protection domains (instead of abstract types) are bound to
the domain arguments.
Note that require is needed in addition to grant because privilege specifications
are used only when a new protection domain is created, and a new protection domain
cannot grant a privilege to a protection domain that has not yet been created. In the
web browser example, the browser global shared state domain cannot grant privileges
to domains for tabs, because the tab domains do not exist when the global shared
state domain is created; rather, the tab domains must require certain privileges from
the global shared state domain when a tab domain is created.
Ribbons are modeled in the language by special classes that implicitly inherit
from java.lang.ThreadGroup and implement the Ribbon interface. The ribbon
keyword declares new ribbon types. The declaration includes a list of named protec-
tion domains, termed the domain arguments, which represent the protection domains
with which threads within the ribbon will be associated. The first protection domain
in this list is called the primary protection domain. The actual domain argument
values are not specified until the ribbon is instantiated. The getdomain operator
is provided to retrieve the protection domain value of a given name for a given rib-
bon object. ribbon classes may optionally extend other ribbon classes, and are
instantiated using the normal new keyword and constructor call, followed by a where
clause to specify the domain argument values for the new ribbon. Once instantiated,
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a ribbon begins execution via the start method exposed through the Ribbon inter-
face, allowing the application to indicate the java.lang.Thread to use as the first
thread.
The new operator is also extended so that a new object can be allocated within a
specific protection domain. If the extended new operator is not used, then the new
object is allocated within the primary protection domain of the ribbon associated
with the currently executing thread. Finally, the thisribbon keyword is added for
convenience to get the object representing the ribbon associated with the currently
executing thread to execute within the context of the new ribbon.
2.6 RibbonJ Example
We give the specifics of the RibbonJ syntax through the Master–Worker example,
as conceptually visualized in Figure 2.1. Each master may spawn multiple workers,
yet:
• Masters may not read/write/inject other masters.
• Masters may read data in workers that are spawned by that master but not by
other masters.
• Workers may not read/write/inject other workers.
• Workers may only receive work from their respective masters.
Three “classes” of protection domains are required to model this: MasterDomain
(stores information needed to produce items), WorkerDomain (stores information
needed to process items), and QueueDomain (stores produced items ready for con-
sumption). Note that multiple masters may be created (e.g., one master for HTTP
requests and another for HTTPS). One must distinguish between the protection do-
mains of these masters. This is e↵ectively modeled within RibbonJ since protection
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domains are modeled as types that are used as “templates” and not fully instanti-
ated until runtime. Protection domain types structure runtime protection domains,
providing rich information for static analyses and compiler optimizations. Figure 2.3
gives the RibbonJ code for defining the protection domain types.
Note how the MasterDomain requires read access to some generic owner domain.
Also, note that MasterDomain needs inject access to the QueueDomain to allocate
new objects inside that domain, while WorkerDomain only requires read/write access
to remove objects from the worker queue for processing. Also of interest is that a
Master needs to be able to read data in Worker domains that it creates. This cannot
be specified in the MasterDomain, because the Worker domains do not exist when
the Master is created. The grant statement allows a Worker, when it is created, to
add to the privileges of the MasterDomain passed to the Worker instantiation. The
protection domain types defined in Figure 2.3 can then be used to instantiate ribbons
that operate within them, as shown in Figure 2.4.
When a new work item is produced, the Master must allocate it within the
QueueDomain so that Worker objects can modify it. This can be done by specifying
a concrete protection domain (some object deriving from ProtectionDomain) within
angle brackets after the new operator and before the type name.
Also, when a new Worker ribbon is instantiated, first a new WorkerDomain pro-
tection domain is created. The constructor for the WorkerDomain requires two do-
main arguments. Here, they are the protection domain named mdom for the current
ribbon, and the qdom protection domain value created earlier. In this way the protec-
tion domain “template” is applied to e↵ect the runtime privileges for the new domain.
The new WorkerDomain value is used to create a new Worker ribbon. The newly in-
stantiated ribbon is then told to begin execution, using a new WorkerThread thread
class as the first thread of execution within the newly executing ribbon. Note that
the WorkerThread and MasterThread classes need not have been declared as inner
classes of their respective ribbons, but were done so for convenience.
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protectiondomain QueueDomain {}
protectiondomain MasterDomain(ProtectionDomain owner, QueueDomain q) {
grant {read,write,inject} to {owner};
require {read} from {owner};
require {read,write,inject} from {q};
}
protectiondomain WorkerDomain(MasterDomain m, QueueDomain q) {
require {read,write} from {q};
grant {read} to {m};
}
Figure 2.3.: RibbonJ code defining protection domain types for the Master–Worker
example.
ribbon Worker(WorkerDomain wdom) {
static class WorkerThread extends Thread {
public void run() { ... }
}
}
ribbon Master(MasterDomain mdom) {
QueueDomain qdom = mdom.q;
Queue q = new<qdom> Queue();
public void createWorker() {
WorkerDomain wd = new WorkerDomain(
getdomain(thisribbon, mdom), qdom);
Worker w = new Worker() where (wd);
w.start(new Worker.WorkerThread());
}
class MasterThread extends java.lang.Thread {
public void produce() {
q.add(new<qdom> WorkItem(...));
}
public void run() {





Figure 2.4.: RibbonJ code defining ribbon types for the Master–Worker example.
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3 RIBBONJ-LITE
To study the isolation properties of RibbonJ we formalize its core. The resulting
syntax and semantics follow in the spirit of other object calculi, e.g., Featherweight
Java (FJ) [59] or Classic Java [45].
3.1 Syntax and Definitions
The syntax of RibbonJ-lite is presented in Figure 3.1. RibbonJ-lite can
be viewed as FJ without subclasses (and thus casts) for simplicity, but augmented
with: protection domain types (D) and protection domain values (⇡), ribbon types
(R) and ribbon values (r(R)), references via location values (l(⇡,C)), field assign-
ments (t.f=t), sequences of terms (t;), threads (newthread <t>{t;}), and ribbons
(newribbon R( t ){t;}).
Protection domain values model first class heaps, and consist of a typed iden-
tifier denoting a concrete instance of the protection domain (rather than actually
containing the values within the protection domain). Protection domain values are
typed, and corresponding declarations are instantiated to yield new protection do-
mains (heaps) at runtime. The protection domain types indicate which permissions
to grant to or require from existing protection domains when creating a new domain.
A global protection domain that always exists is identified as ⇡?, which has a pro-
tection domain type of PDomain. Ribbon values model the set of protection domains
that should be “active” when executing terms in threads belonging to the ribbon.
Ribbon values consist of a sequence storing the values of the named protection do-
mains for that ribbon. Location values l(⇡,C) uniquely identify how to retrieve a
value from the object store. Locations may only point to object values, and not to
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program PR ::= newribbon R(⇡?){t;}
protection dom. PD ::= protectiondomain D(D x){P}
privilege P ::= Z(A, x)
privilege type Z ::= grant | require
access type A ::= read | write | inject
ribbon RB ::= ribbon R(D x)
class CL ::= class C {C f ; K M}
construction K ::= C(C f){this.f=f;}
method M ::= T m(T x) {t;}
type T ::= C | D | R | Ref T
term t ::= x | v | t.f | t.f=t | t.m(t)
| new<t> C(t) | newdomain D(t)
| newribbon R(t){t;}
| newthread<t>{t;} | getdomain(t, x)
value v ::= ⇡(D) | r(R) | l(⇡, C)
Figure 3.1.: RibbonJ-lite language syntax.
protection domain values, ribbon values, or other locations. As field values are stored
by reference via locations, fields may thus only store references to object values. This
simplifies the typing and evaluation rules and related theorems, without the loss of
any interesting points from the proofs. C denotes the class of the object, while ⇡
denotes the protection domain value within which the object is contained. Locations
may simply be written l for brevity when the containing protection domain and type
C are not germane to the context.
A class table CT is a mapping from class names C to class declarations CL.
Similarly, there is a protection domain table PDT and ribbon table RT that map
protection domain and ribbon names to their declarations. For simplicity, it is as-
sumed that the CT , PDT , and RT tables are fixed. A complete program is a tuple
(CT, PDT,RT, PR) consisting of the definitions of the fixed tables, as well as a state-
ment (PR) that creates an initial ribbon, passing the global protection domain value
⇡?to the ribbon constructor (the specified type of the initial ribbon must therefore
have a ribbon constructor that accepts a single argument of type PDomain).
In RibbonJ-lite we chose not to overload the new operator for readability, but
instead introduced di↵erent operators to create new ribbons, protection domains,
and objects. The newdomain operator creates new protection domains and accepts
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Field lookup fields(C)=C f
fields(Thread)=; CT (C) = class C {C f; K M}
fields(C)=C f
Method type lookup mtype(m,C)=T!T






Method body lookup mbody(m,C)=(x,t)





Protection domain field lookup dfields(D)=D x
dfields(PDomain)=; PDT (D) = protectiondomain D(D x)...
dfields(D)=D x
Protection domain privilege lookup domprivs(D)
PDT (D) = protectiondomain D(...){P}
Z(A, x); 2 P
hZ,A, xi 2 domprivs(D)
Ribbon field lookup rfields(R)=D x
RT (R) = ribbon R(D x)
rfields(R) = PDomain default, D x
Figure 3.2.: Auxiliary definitions for RibbonJ-lite, providing relations for lookup
of fields, types, and privileges.
concrete protection domain values referenced within the relevant protection domain
type. newribbon creates new ribbons and accepts the protection domain values within
which the new ribbon should operate. The first protection domain value passed to
the ribbon constructor is also defined as the default protection domain for the new
ribbon. In addition to creating a new memory execution context the new ribbon also
implicitly creates a new thread within the new ribbon’s memory context. getdomain
allows retrieval of one of the named protection domain values associated with a given
ribbon value (or the default protection domain value). Thread creation is augmented
to indicate the ribbon value of the ribbon in which the new thread should execute.
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Object creation is augmented to accept the protection domain value in which the new
object should be created.
In RibbonJ-lite the thisribbon keyword provides access to the ribbon value of
the ribbon that owns the currently executing thread; however, in RibbonJ-lite the
thisribbon keyword is not allowed to be used within method body terms. Supporting
thisribbon within method body terms while still having typing be syntax directed
and modular would require modeling subtyping between ribbon types and downcasts.
Rather than unnecessarily complicate the model and distract from its main purpose
(modeling isolation properties), the choice was made to limit thisribbon support only
to program terms. The thisribbon keyword in method body terms can be emulated
in RibbonJ-lite by instead requiring the ribbon value to be passed as a parameter
to the method. Similar to how the this keyword is implemented, the thisribbon
keyword is implemented as a special variable, which allows typing to remain strictly
syntax directed. Figure 3.2 has auxiliary definitions for the language.
3.2 Typing
Typing rules follow straightforwardly from the syntax and the above descriptions
and are given in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Term typings are similar to those for FJ,
with the exception that the target of field accesses and method invocations expect ref-
erences to objects instead of object themselves. Object construction typing is likewise
modified to expect a reference to the new object to be returned. Additional term typ-
ing rules are present for protection domain instantiation, ribbon instantiation, thread
instantiation, and a few other new terms. Method and class well formedness is sim-
plified compared to FJ due to the lack of subtyping. Syntactically correct protection
domain declarations and ribbon declarations are always well typed. Despite the pres-
ence of locations, a store typing is not necessary, because location values explictily
contain the type of the value being reference by the location.
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Term typing   ` t : T
x : T 2  
  ` x : T (T-Var)
  ` ⇡(D) : D (T-DValue)
  ` r(R) : R (T-RValue)
  ` l(⇡(D), C) : Ref C (T-LValue)
  ` tn : Tn ...   ` t0 : T0
  ` tn;...;t0 : T0
(T-Sequence)
  ` t0 : Ref C0 fields(C0) = C f
  ` t0.fi : Ref Ci
(T-FieldGet)
  ` t0 : Ref C0   ` td : Ref Ci
fields(C0) = C f
  ` t0.fi=td : Ref Ci
(T-FieldSet)
  ` t0 : Ref C0   ` t : T
mtype(m,C0) = T ! T0
  ` t0.m(t) : T0 (T-Invoke)
  ` t : D
fields(C) = C f   ` t : Ref C
  ` new<t> C(t) : Ref C
(T-New)
  ` t : D
dfields(D) = D x
  ` newdomain D(t) : D
(T-NewDomain)
  ` t : D
rfields(R) = D x
 , thisribbon : R ` t0 : T 0
  ` newribbon R(t){t0;} : R
(T-NewRibbon)
  ` t : D   ` t : T
  ` newthread<t>{t;} : Ref Thread
(T-NewThread)
  ` t0 : R0 rfields(R0) = D f
  ` getdomain(t0, fi) : Di
(T-GetDomain)
Figure 3.3.: Term typing rules for RibbonJ-lite.
Protection domain typing D OK
protectiondomain D(D x){P}
protectiondomain D(D x){P} OK
Ribbon typing R OK
ribbon R(D x)
ribbon R(D x) OK
Method typing M OK in C
mtype(m,C) = T ! T 00
x : T, this : C ` tn : T 0n
...
x : T, this : C ` t0 : T 00
CT (C) = class C {...}
T 00 m(T x) {tn;...;t0} OK in C
Class typing C OK
K = C(C f){this.f=f;}
M OK in C
class C {C f; K M} OK




Figures 3.5–3.8 define an operational semantics for RibbonJ-lite. Global evalu-
ation is of the form hQ, E ,P ,Ri=)hQ0, E 0,P 0,R0i where Q is a parallel composition
of executing threads (T{...})
Q ::= ; | Q · T{t;}
and where E is an object store, P is the privilege set, and R is the ribbon thread
context – an ordered set of ribbon values storing the current ribbon value for each
active thread. The privilege set tracks permissions for source protection domains
⇡SD on target domains ⇡TD using tuples h⇡SD, ⇡TD, privilegei. The object store E is
explicitly typed, which simplifies the proofs. The initial Q value is initialized to be a
thread that contains the newribbon term from the starting statement of the program
(PR).
Figure 3.5 defines global evaluation rules. Rule Congr-E relates local and global
evaluation. Congruence on global evaluation (Congr-E) relies on evaluation contexts,
E, defined in Figure 3.6. Rule Fork-E creates a new thread of control operating
within the context of the specified ribbon. The ribbon thread context R=r(R) is
appended with the given ribbon value, remembering for each thread the ribbon within
which the thread is operating. The newthread expression on the creating thread of
execution is replaced with an expression to create a new Thread object representing
the newly created thread. Rule End-E ends a thread that has finished computing its
terms into values.
The evaluation contexts in Figure 3.6 implicitly define local congruence evaluation
rules with the name given by the evaluation context. For example, the evaluation
context v.m(v, E, t) implicitly defines the local evaluation ruleMeth-Arg-CTX-E:
hti, E ,P ,Ri  ! ht0i, E 0,P 0,Ri
hv.m(v, ti, t), E ,P ,Ri  ! hv.m(v, t0i, t), E 0,P 0,Ri
35
ht, E ,P ,Rji !ht0, E 0,P 0,Rji
hT{...} · T0j{E[t]} · T{...}00, E ,P ,R · Rj · R0i=)
hT{...} · T0j{E[t0]} · T{...}00, E 0,P 0,R · Rj · R0i
(Congr-E)
hT{...}·T0j{E[newthread<r(R)>{t;}]}·T{...}00, E ,P ,Ri=)
hT{...}·T0j{E[new Thread()]}·T{...}00·T{t;}, E ,P ,R·r(R)i (Fork-E)
R=R00 · Rj · R000 R0=R00 · R000
hT{...}·T0j{v;} · T{...}00, E ,P ,Ri=)hT{...}·T{...}00, E ,P ,R0i
(End-E)








| v.m(v, E, t) (Meth-Arg-CTX-E)
| new<E> C(t) (Cons-DomArg-CTX-E)
| new<⇡> C(v, E, t) (Cons-Arg-CTX-E)
| newribbon R(v, E, t){t0;} (New-Ribbon-DomArg-CTX-E)
| newthread<E>{t;} (New-Thread-RibArg-CTX-E)
| newdomain D(v, E, t) (New-Domain-DomArg-CTX-E)
| getdomain(E, x) (Get-Domain-DomArg-CTX-E)
Figure 3.6.: Evaluation contexts, E, for RibbonJ-lite.
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hZ,A, xi 2 domprivs(D) Z=grant (x :⇡x) 2 ⇧
h⇡x, ⇡, Ai 2 buildnewprivs(P ,R,⇧, ⇡(D)) (Build-Grant-Privs)
hZ,A, xi 2 domprivs(D) Z=require (x :⇡x) 2 ⇧
h⇡, ⇡x, Ai 2 buildnewprivs(P ,R,⇧, ⇡(D)) (Build-Require-Privs)
Figure 3.7.: Definition of the buildnewprivs helper relation, which is used to define
the set of privileges that a newly created protection domain acquires. The relation
is contextual to P , the current privilege set, R, the ribbon thread context, ⇧, the
mapping from protection domain parameter name to protation domain value, and
⇡(D), the protection domain value representing the newly created protection domain.
The pattern for the other implicitly defined congruence rules is the same. Naming
these implicitly defined rules allows for greater precision in the progress proof.
Figure 3.8 defines local evaluation rules. Rules for local evaluation ht, E ,P ,Ri !
ht0, E 0,P 0,Ri only include one ribbon value, R, corresponding to the ribbon value
associated with the thread of the single thread term being reduced. Note that local
evaluation never changes R. For simplicity it is assumed that only RibbonJ-lite
programs that produce the same result regardless of thread evaluation order need to be
considered. Adding mechanisms to the formal model to properly deal with programs
that are not deterministic with respect to thread evaluation order is not worth the
extra complexity, as it would detract from the main purpose of the formal model (to
model heap isolation properties). Using formal models to understand determinism
within concurrent programs is explored by Ziarek [124].
Rule Sequence-Next-E reduces a sequence to the last value after all terms in
the sequence have been fully evaluated. Rule Cons-E creates a new object within a
specified protection domain, verifying that the current ribbon has the inject privilege
on the target domain. The access check occurring within the second line of the rule’s
antecedent ensures that at least one of the protection domains associated with the
current thread’s ribbon has the inject privilege on the protection domain within
which the new object is being created. Rules Field-Acc-E and Field-Ass-E allow
field access and assignment and checks for the read or write privilege as appropriate.
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hv1;...;vn, E ,P ,Ri !hvn, E ,P ,Ri (Sequence-Next-E)
E (l)=[..., Ref Ci :fi :v, ...] 9 (xi :⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, readi 2 P
hl(⇡, C).fi, E ,P , r(R)i !hv, E ,P , r(R)i (Field-Acc-E)
E (l)=[..., Ref Ci :fi :v, ...] 9 (xi :⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, writei 2 P
hl(⇡, C).fi=v0, E ,P , r(R)i !hv0, {l 7![..., Ref Ci :fi :v0, ...]}E ,P , r(R)i
(Field-Ass-E)
mbody(m,C)=(x, t) 9 (xi :⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, readi 2 P
hl(⇡, C).m(v), E ,P , r(R)i !h{l/this,v/x}t, E ,P , r(R)i
(Meth-E)
l 62 dom(E ) E 0={l 7![Ref C1 :f1 :v1, ..., Ref Cn :fn :vn]}E fields(C)=C f
9 (xi :⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, injecti 2 P
hnew<⇡> C(v), E ,P , r(R)i !hl(⇡, C), E 0,P , r(R)i (Cons-E)
r(R)=[default:v1, x1 :v1, ..., xn :vn] rfields(R)=D x
hnewribbon R(v){t;}, E ,P ,Ri !
hnewthread<r(R)>{{r(R) thisribbon}t;};r(R), E ,P ,Ri
(New-Ribbon-E)
...(⇡(D), ...) 62 dom(E )
⇧=[x1 :v1, ..., xn :vn] dfields(D)=D x
P 0=buildnewprivs(P ,R,⇧, ⇡(D)) [ P
hnewdomain D(v), E ,P ,Ri !h⇡(D), E ,P 0,Ri (New-Domain-E)
v=r(R) rfields(R) = D f
r(R)=[..., fi :⇡(Di), ...]
hgetdomain(v, fi), E ,P ,Ri !h⇡(Di), E ,P ,Ri (Get-Domain-E)
Figure 3.8.: Local evaluation in the form ht, E ,P ,Ri !ht0, E 0,P 0,Ri.
The rule for method calls, Meth-E, verifies that the current ribbon has the read
privilege on the target object.
Rule New-Ribbon-E creates a new ribbon value and forks a thread using this
value. The   operator is a special variable substitution operator that is used to
substitute the thisribbon special variable with the value representing the new ribbon;
however, it di↵ers from normal variable substitution in that it does not recursively
substitute inside of any newribbon terms (doing so would not be correct, because the
value of thisribbon inside of these newribbon terms would be di↵erent). The new
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ribbon value’s named protection domain values are initialized using the protection
domain values passed as arguments. Note that the value to which the newribbon
term evaluates is the new ribbon value, not the value that the newthread expression
evaluates to.
Rule New-Domain-E creates a new protection domain value using the given pro-
tection domain type as a template. This template is used to add to the privilege set
to both (a) grant other protection domains privileges to the new domain (through
grant), and (b) grant the new protection domain privileges to other domains (through
require). These e↵ects are modeled through buildnewprivs. Rule Get-Domain-E
retrieves a named protection domain value from a given ribbon value.
3.4 Type Preservation
Type preservation is proved by following the proof strategy used in FJ [59]. The
lack of subtyping simplifies the proof’s complexity. Of all of the additional features
in RibbonJ-lite vs FJ, locations add the most complexity to the proof. However, a
store typing is not needed (removing the need for supporting properties and lemmas
required to show that a store is well typed with respect to a typing context) because
location values explicitly encode the types of the values they refer to.
First, a few straightforward lemmas are developed.
Lemma 3.4.1 (Term Substitution Operator / Preserves Typing) If  , x : T `
t : T and   ` t : T, then   ` {t/x}t : T
Proof Straightforward induction on the derivation of  , x : T ` t : T. The proof
follows the same strategy as Lemma A.1.2 in FJ [59], except that it is much simpler
because of the lack of subtyping. Intuitively, a substituted term is always replaced
with a term that has an identical type, and therefore the type of the overall expression
does not change.
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Lemma 3.4.2 (Term Special Substitution Operator   Preserves Typing) If
 , x : T ` t : T and   ` t : T, then   ` {t x}t : T
Proof The proof is nearly identical to the proof for Lemma 3.4.1, except for the
case of the T-NewRibbon typing rule. In this case, substitution is not applied into
the sequence of terms executed in the context of the new ribbon. It follows that in
this special case the type of the expression does not change, because no changes are
made to the expression.
Lemma 3.4.3 (Weakening) If   ` t : T, then  , x : T 0 ` t : T.
Proof Straightforward induction, following the same strategy as Lemma A.1.3 in
FJ [59].
Theorem 3.4.4 (Preservation) If   ` t : T and ht, E ,P ,Ri !ht0, E 0,P 0,Ri, then
  ` t0 : T.
Proof By induction on derivation of t  ! t0, with a case analysis on the reduction
rule used. Note that E , P , and R are not relevant to the proof and so are elided
when writing out evaluation rules in this proof to keep the notation easier to read.
Case Sequence-Next-E:




  ` v1;...;vn : Tn
It immediately follows that setting T =T n completes this case.
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Case Field-Acc-E:
E (l)=[..., Ref Ci :fi :vi, ...]
fields(C) = C f
t = l(⇡, C).fi
t0 = vi
By rule T-FieldGet,
  ` l(⇡, C).fi : Ref Ci
From the explicit typing information in E (l) for f i we have
  ` vi : Ref Ci
Setting T =Ref Ci completes this case.
Case Field-Ass-E:
E (l)=[..., Ref Ci :fi :vi, ...]
fields(C) = C f
  ` v0 : Ref Ci
t = l(⇡, C).fi=v0
t0 = v0
By rule T-FieldSet,
  ` l(⇡, C).fi=v0 : Ref Ci
It immediately follows that setting T =Ref Ci completes this case.
Case Meth-E:
mbody(m,C)=(x, tn;...;t0)




mtype(m,C) = T ! T 00
  ` v : T
  ` l(⇡, C).m(v) : T 00
Also we know that m OK in C, so it follows that
x : T, this : Ref C ` t0 : T 00
By Lemma 3.4.3,
 , x : T, this : Ref C ` t0 : T 00
Then by rule T-LValue and by Lemma 3.4.1,
  ` l(⇡, C) : Ref C
  ` {l/this,v/x}t0 : T 00
Finally, by rule T-Sequence,
  ` {l/this,v/x}tn;...;t0 : T 00
Setting T =T 00 finishes this case.
Case Cons-E:
  ` ⇡(D) : D
fields(C) = C f
  ` v : Ref C
t = new<⇡(D)> C(v)
t0 = l(⇡(D), C)
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By rule T-New,
  ` new<⇡(D)> C(v) : Ref C
By rule T-LValue,
  ` l(⇡(D), C) : Ref C
Setting T =Ref C therefore completes this case.
Case New-Ribbon-E:
r(R)=[default:v1, x1 :v1, ..., xn :vn]
rfields(R)=D x
t = newribbon R(v){t;}
t0 = newthread<r(R)>{{r(R) thisribbon}t;};r(R)
By rule T-NewRibbon,
  ` v : D
 , thisribbon : R ` t : T
  ` newribbon R(v){t;} : R
Then by rule T-RValue and by Lemma 3.4.2,
  ` r(R) : R
...
  ` {r(R) thisribbon}ti : Ti
...
By rule T-NewThread,
  ` newthread<r(R)>{{r(R) thisribbon}t;} : Ref Thread
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Finally, by rule T-Sequence,
  ` newthread<r(R)>{{r(R) thisribbon}t;};r(R) : R
Setting T =R completes this case.
Case New-Domain-E:
dfields(D) = D x
t = newdomain D(v)
t0 = ⇡(D)
By rule T-NewDomain,
  ` newdomain D(v) : D
By rule T-DValue,
  ` ⇡(D) : D
Setting T =D completes this case.
Case Get-Domain-E:
r(R) = [..., fi :⇡(Di), ...]
rfields(R) = D f
t = getdomain(r(R), fi)
t0 = ⇡(Di)
By rule T-GetDomain,
  ` getdomain(r(R), fi) : Di
By rule T-DValue,
  ` ⇡(Di) : Di
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Setting T =Di completes this case.
Case for all local congruence rules (*-CTX-E):
All of these implicitly defined local congruence evaluation rules involve the evaluation
of some subterm t0 to t00 with the enclosing expression remaining otherwise unchanged.
By the induction hypothesis, if   ` t0 : T0, then   ` t00 : T0. By Lemma 3.4.1, if
the original term t has type T , then substituting t0 (of type T 0) with t00 (of the same
type) within t does not change the type of t. Thus, after evaluation, t still has type
T , completing this case.
3.5 Progress
In the absence of casts, the original progress theorem of FJ is simplified, notwith-
standing our additions of locations (since locations explicitly include type informa-
tion). We define stuck terms to account for the cases where a protection domain
privilege check fails.
First, we prove a lemma that shows that for every well typed term that is able
to be evaluated, there is a unique decomposition of such a term into an evaluation
context and a redex, and the redex is able to be reduced by one of the “base case”
evaluation rules. As before, if E , P , and R are not changed by local evaluation they
are elided from the notation.
Lemma 3.5.1 (Unique Decomposition) If ht, E ,P ,Ri !ht0, E 0,P 0,Ri then there
are unique E, e, and e0 such that (1) t=E[e], (2) t0=E[e0], and (3) e  ! e0 by one
of the “redex reduction rules”: Cons-E, Field-Acc-E, Field-Ass-E, Meth-E,
Sequence-Next-E, New-Domain-E, New-Ribbon-E, or Get-Domain-E.
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Proof By induction on the derivation of ht, E ,P ,Ri !ht0, E 0,P 0,Ri, with a case
analysis on the last derivation rule used.
For each of the cases of Cons-E, Field-Acc-E, Field-Ass-E, Meth-E,
Sequence-Next-E, New-Domain-E, New-Ribbon-E, or Get-Domain-E, set-
ting E=•, e=t, and e0 = t0 completes the case.
Case Meth-Arg-CTX-E:
ti  ! t0i
t = v.m(v, ti, t)
t0 = v.m(v, t0i, t)
By the induction hypothesis, there are unique E0, e0, and e00 such that (1) t0=E0[e0],
(2) t00=E0[e
0
0], and (3) e0  ! e00 by one of the redex reduction rules. Setting E=
v.m(v,E0,t), e=e0, and e0 = e00 completes this case.
All of the other cases for *-CTX-E rules are similar. The key point in proving each
case is that for a given expression to be evaluated, and a given particular sub-term
that can be evaluated under one of the redex reduction rules, there is only one possible
evaluation context that can be used to place the hole where the given sub-term is
being evaluated. By inspection of the evaluation contexts in Figure 3.6 it can be seen
that for each type of syntactic expression for a particular location in that expression
where is sub-term is being evaluated by a redex rule there is exactly one evaluation
context that is applicable. Combining this with a one-to-one correspondence between
each evaluation context and an *-CTX-E rule, we conclude that this Lemma holds
for all of the remaining cases.
Theorem 3.5.2 (Local Progress) Suppose t is a closed, well-typed term and t is
within ht, E ,P ,Ri. Then either
1. ht, E ,P ,Ri !ht0, E 0,P 0,Ri for some t0, E 0, and P 0
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2. t is a value
3. t is a “stuck term” in that 9E such that any of the following hold:
(a) t=E[newthread<r(R)>{t;}]
(b) t=E[new<⇡> C(v)] ^ @ (xi :⇡i) 2 R|h⇡i, ⇡, injecti 2 P
(c) t=E[l(⇡, C).fi] ^ @ (xi :⇡i) 2 R|h⇡i, ⇡, readi 2 P
(d) t=E[l(⇡, C).fi=v0] ^ @ (xi :⇡i) 2 R|h⇡i, ⇡, writei 2 P
(e) t=E[l(⇡, C).m(v)] ^ @ (xi :⇡i) 2 R|h⇡i, ⇡, readi 2 P




If tn..ti+1 are values and ti is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis on ti, the
following are possible: (1) ti !t0i and then Sequence-CTX-E applies, or (2) ti is
a value, but for this sub-case we already know ti is not a value so this sub-case does
not apply, or (3) ti=Ei[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=tn;..;ti+1;Ei;ti 1;..;t0.




By the induction hypothesis on t0, the following are possible: (1) t0 !t00 and
then Field-Acc-CTX-E applies, or (2) t0 =E0[stuck], and then t =E[stuck] for
E =E0.f , or (3) t0 is a value. If t0 is a value (t0 = l(⇡,C)) there are two cases:
if 9 (xi : ⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, readi 2 P , then Field-Acc-E applies and progress is
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made; otherwise, we are stuck. However, applying Lemma 3.5.1 to the last step of
the evaluation derivation of t implies that t =E[e] for some unique E and e. By





If t0 is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis on t0, the following are
possible: (1) t0 !t00 and then Field-Ass-Tgt-CTX-E applies, or (2) t0 is a value,
but for this sub-case we already know t0 is not a value so this sub-case does not apply,
or (3) t0=E0[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=E0.f=td.
If t0 is a value and td is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis on td, the
following are possible: (1) td !t0d and then Field-Ass-Val-CTX-E applies, or (2)
td is a value, but for this sub-case we already know td is not a value so this sub-case
does not apply, or (3) td=Ed[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=t0.f=Ed.
If both t0 and td are values (t0=l(⇡,C)), then there are two cases: if 9 (xi :⇡i) 2
r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, writei 2 P , then Field-Ass-E applies and progress is made; otherwise,
we are stuck. However, applying Lemma 3.5.1 to the last step of the evaluation
derivation of t implies that t=E[e] for some unique E and e. By inspection, this





If t0 is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis on t0, the following are
possible: (1) t0 !t00 and then Meth-Tgt-CTX-E applies, or (2) t0 is a value, but
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for this sub-case we already know t0 is not a value so this sub-case does not apply, or
(3) t0=E0[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=E0.m(t).
If t0 is a value and t1..ti 1 are values and ti is not a value, then by the induction
hypothesis on ti, the following are possible: (1) ti !t0i and thenMeth-Arg-CTX-E
applies, or (2) ti is a value, but for this sub-case we already know ti is not a value
so this sub-case does not apply, or (3) ti=Ei[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=
t0.m(t1,..,Ei,..,tn).
If both t0 and t1..tn are all values (t0 = l(⇡,C)), then there are two cases: if
9 (xi : ⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, readi 2 P , then Meth-E applies and progress is made;
otherwise, we are stuck. However, applying Lemma 3.5.1 to the last step of the
evaluation derivation of t implies that t=E[e] for some unique E and e. By inspection,
this unique e must be l(⇡,C).m(t), and thus stuck term (e) of this theorem is fully
applicable.
Case T-New:
t = new<t0> C(t)
R = r(R)
If t0 is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis on t0, the following are
possible: (1) t0 !t00 and then Cons-DomArg-CTX-E applies, or (2) t0 is a value,
but for this sub-case we already know t0 is not a value so this sub-case does not apply,
or (3) t0=E0[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=new <E0> C(t).
If t0 is a value and t1..ti 1 are values and ti is not a value, then by the induction
hypothesis on ti, the following are possible: (1) ti !t0i and then Cons-Arg-CTX-E
applies, or (2) ti is a value, but for this sub-case we already know ti is not a value so
this sub-case does not apply, or (3) ti=Ei[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=new
<t0> C(t1,..,Ei,..,tn).
If both t0 and t1..tn are all values (t0=⇡), then there are two cases: if 9 (xi :⇡i) 2
r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡, injecti 2 P , then Cons-E applies and progress is made; otherwise, we
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are stuck. However, applying Lemma 3.5.1 to the last step of the evaluation derivation
of t implies that t=E[e] for some unique E and e. By inspection, this unique e must
be new <⇡> C(t), and thus stuck term (b) of this theorem is fully applicable.
Case T-NewDomain:
t = newdomain D(t)
If t1..ti 1 are values and ti is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis, the
following are possible: (1) ti !t0i and then New-Domain-DomArg-CTX-E ap-
plies, or (2) ti is a value, but for this sub-case we already know ti is not a value
so this sub-case does not apply, or (3) ti=Ei[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=
newdomain D( t1,..,Ei,..,tn ). If t1..tn are all values, then New-Domain-E applies
and progress is made.
Case T-NewRibbon:
t = newribbon R(t){t00;}
If t1..ti 1 are values and ti is not a value, then by the induction hypothesis, the
following are possible: (1) ti !t0i and thenNew-Ribbon-DomArg-CTX-E applies,
or (2) ti is a value, but for this sub-case we already know ti is not a value so this sub-
case does not apply, or (3) ti=Ei[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=newribbon R(




By the induction hypothesis on t0, the following are possible: (1) t0 !t00 and then
New-Thread-RibArg-CTX-E applies, or (2) t0=E0[stuck], and then t=E[stuck]
for E=newthread <E0>{t;}, or (3) t0 is a value. If t0 is a value, we are stuck, because
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there is no local evaluation rule that is applicable. However, applying Lemma 3.5.1 to
the last step of the evaluation derivation of t implies that t=E[e] for some unique E
and e. By inspection, this unique e must be newthread <r(R)>{t;}, and thus stuck
term (a) of this theorem is fully applicable.
Case T-GetDomain:
t = getdomain(t0, fi)
By the induction hypothesis on t0, the following are possible: (1) t0 !t00 and then
Get-Domain-DomArg-CTX-E applies, or (2) t0 is a value and thenGet-Domain-E
applies, or (3) t0=E0[stuck], and then t=E[stuck] for E=getdomain (E0, x).
Case T-Var: This case does not apply, as t is a closed term.
For the cases for T-DValue, T-RValue, and T-LValue, t is a value.
Theorem 3.5.3 (Global Progress) Suppose Q is a closed, well-typed normal form
under =). Then either of the following holds:
1. Q is a parallel composition of non-value terms where each term matches one of
the second, third, fourth, or fifth non-value normal forms in Theorem 3.5.2.
2. Q is a parallel composition of zero executing threads.
Proof Proof by contradiction. There are two cases to consider:
1. Suppose Q is in normal form and is a parallel composition of thread terms,
and at least one of the terms is not a value and does not match one of the
second, third, fourth, or fifth stuck terms listed in Theorem 3.5.2. If this term
contains a newthread term, then because Q is well typed and because of type
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preservation, the rule Fork-E is applicable and progress is made. If this term
does not contain a newthread term then by Theorem 3.5.2 this non-value term
can be further evaluated under  !, and thus global progress can be made under
Congr-E. Thus, in either case, Q cannot be in normal form.
2. Suppose Q is in normal form and is a parallel composition of thread terms,
and at least one of the terms is a value. For such a term, the rule End-E is
applicable and progress is made. Thus, Q cannot be in normal form.
3.6 Isolation
With the RibbonJ-lite semantics above, a new protection domain can grant
or require privileges to or from any other domain. While this structures the heap
and prevents inadvertent accesses, it is not strict enough to fully isolate or sandbox
code executing in ribbons. We provide two extensions for di↵erent levels of isolation,
ending with an isolation model matching that of RibbonJ.
3.6.1 Cooperative Isolation
Under this first model, a new protection domain P cannot require a privilege from
another protection domain Q unless at least one of the protection domains in the
creator’s ribbon already has the privilege on domain Q. Thus, the new protection
domain is unable to increase the scope of what the creator’s ribbon is able to access,
but the new domain is able to grant privileges to other domains which these did not
have on the creator’s ribbon. The creating ribbon thereby controls which protection
domains have access to the new domain via the protection domain values it passes
to the domain being constructed. While not suitable for sandboxing potentially ma-
licious or insecure components, this isolation level does allow for more flexibility in
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that a ribbon can create a new protection domain in order to communicate, indirectly,
with domains which with it currently does not have privileges to communicate.
The semantics of Figures 3.5–3.8 are retained, but we replace the Build-Require-
Privs rule of Figure 3.7 as follows:
hZ,A, xi 2 domprivs(D) Z=require (x :⇡x) 2 ⇧
R=r(R) 9 (xi :⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡i, ⇡x, Ai 2 P
h⇡, ⇡x, Ai 2 buildnewprivs(P ,R,⇧, ⇡(D))
(Build-Require-Privs)
This rule has an additional check in the antecedent, ensuring that the creating ribbon
already has the privilege that the new protection domain is requiring. Observe that
rather than creating a new kind of stuck term, progress is still made if a new protection
domain tries to require a privilege it is not allowed to receive. Instead of becoming
stuck, such a privilege is not added to the new set. Local evaluation could later get
stuck if it tries to access a location in a protection domain that it was not allowed to
require a privilege to.
3.6.2 Full Isolation
In this level the same restrictions apply as in cooperative isolation. Additionally,
a new protection domain P cannot grant a privilege to another protection domain
Q unless domain Q already has this privilege on one of the domains of the creator’s
ribbon. Under this level of isolation, a new protection domain is fully sandboxed
within its creating ribbon. This matches the isolation behavior of RibbonJ. The
dynamic semantics of this isolation level are the same as with cooperative isolation,
except that Build-Grant-Privs is substituted with:
hZ,A, xi 2 domprivs(D) Z=grant (x :⇡x) 2 ⇧
R=r(R) 9 (xi :⇡i) 2 r(R)|h⇡x, ⇡i, Ai 2 P
h⇡x, ⇡, Ai 2 buildnewprivs(P ,R,⇧, ⇡(D))
(Build-Grant-Privs)
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A privilege check is added to the antecedent of the rule to ensure that a privilege
can only be granted when appropriate, as defined above. The e↵ect on progress is
similar to that of cooperative isolation– no new stuck terms are added, but rather
local evaluation may become stuck if it tries to use a privilege that was not granted
when the protection domain was created.
3.6.3 Adaptable Isolation Levels
The isolation level need not be decided once for the whole program, but can be
indicated when a new ribbon is created. Only a same or more strict isolation level
than the current ribbon’s level would be allowed, and the rules for constructing the
modified privilege set would depend on the isolation level.
We outline the required changes to the dynamic semantics to support adaptable
isolation levels. First, ribbon values would be augmented to store the isolation levels
associated with them. Ribbon creation would be augmented to allow the new isolation
level to be specified. A check would be added to the evaluation rule for newribbon
such that the isolation level of a new ribbon r could not be less restrictive than
the isolation level of the ribbon value associated with the thread that is creating r.
Finally, the di↵erent variants of the Build-Grant-Privs and Build-Require-Privs
rules would become applicable based on the isolation level of the new ribbon.
3.7 Narrowing Extension
As defined above the granularity of the sandboxing is at the thread-level – all code
executes within a certain thread with the same privileges. It can be useful to provide
a finer granularity where certain segments of code executed within a thread to execute
with less privileges than the rest of the thread. Imagine an application that needs
to call code within some untrusted plugin. In its present form, a new ribbon (and
thereby new thread) would have to be created, and the plugin code executed within
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this separate thread. If the trusted code and untrusted code are interwoven, this
can create complexities as interaction has to be marshalled and synchronized across
threads. The concept of narrowing is thus introduced to allow a thread to lower its
privileges for the duration of a method call.
Narrowing is supported by optionally allowing a new ribbon value to be specified
when calling a method as the new “ribbon context” in which the thread should run.
A check is made if a new ribbon context is provided to ensure that the privileges are
indeed the same or are being narrowed, rather than being expanded.
For brevity, the complete details of the modified semantics are elided, but rather a
sketch of the required changes is given. First, the ribbon thread context (R) would not
store, for each thread, the ribbon values, but a stack of ribbon values. All inference
rules that referred to the ribbon value for the currently executing thread would be
changed to instead refer to the ribbon value at the top of the thread’s ribbon value
stack. The method call expression would be augmented to provide the new ribbon
value context in which the method executes. A check would be added to ensure that
the set of protection domains for the ribbon value passed to a method call is a subset
of the set of protection domains for the ribbon value at the top of the current thread’s
ribbon value stack. A method return expression would be added so that the ribbon
value stack for a thread could be properly maintained. Finally, the congruence rule
would be adjusted to allow local evaluation to change R.
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4 IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of RibbonJ is three-fold, comprised of the compiler modifica-
tions for RibbonJ within JastAdd [41], the modifications to JikesRVM [6], and the
system level support. All code and evaluation data is available for download [56].
The implementation separates support for RibbonJ concepts into two layers –
a higher-level layer implementing the semantics of protection domains and ribbons
as provided within RibbonJ, and a more flexible low-level layer that provides the
basic runtime primitives necessary to support the higher-level layer. The lower layer
implementation separates the notion of memory domains and protection domains.
Memory domains divide the heap into di↵erent regions, just as with protection do-
mains; however, access privileges are modeled between concrete ribbons and concrete
memory domains (instead of between classes of protection domains, as it is modeled
in the higher layer), and isolation properties are only enforced if it is explicitly told
to do so. Additionally, ribbons are allowed to dynamically join and leave memory
domains (if they have the privileges to do so).
This underlying runtime model is more flexible than the protection domain and
ribbon runtime model in RibbonJ as domain membership and privileges are dynamic
rather than static. The higher layer implementation builds upon and constrains these
lower-level concepts to provide the stricter semantics of RibbonJ. This separation
allows the lower layer implementation to focus strictly on the runtime aspects of the
coreRibbonJ concepts, enabling higher-level layers to be built that provide semantics
specific to a higher level language. Other language extensions (not in Java) could thus
be implemented that are more appropriate to the specific language being extended,
without having to modify the functionality provided by the lower layer.
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4.1 Language Frontend: JastAdd
The parser and bytecode compiler forRibbonJ are implemented with JastAdd [41].
JastAdd provides declarative mechanisms for modular and composable compiler ex-
tensions.
Modules were implemented for extending the lexer and parser as well as for
RibbonJ-specific type checking, which were then composed with the unmodified
modules for the JastAddJ Java 5 compiler. Most of the RibbonJ features were im-
plemented through straightforward AST rewriting mechanisms to translate features
to a Java API implemented by the VM. A few features required modifications in
the compiler backend as there was no equivalent syntactic Java expression that the
RibbonJ expression could be translated into.
4.1.1 Compiler Frontend
The compiler frontend consists of the extended lexer, new AST nodes, extended
parser, type checking logic, and AST rewriting logic.
The lexer was extended to handle the new protectiondomain, grant, require,
ribbon, where, getdomain, and thisribbon keywords.
The AST was extended as shown in Figure 4.1. A protection domain was mod-
eled in the AST as a class declaration that also specifies protection domain pa-
rameters for protection domain construction. Type checking rules enforces that
ProtectionDomainPrivDecl is the only type of class body declaration statement
allowed within a protection domain declarations. Likewise, type checking also en-
sures that ProtectionDomainPrivDecl statements are only used within protection
domain declarations. This strategy of having a protection domain declaration be
treated as a sub-class of a class declaration by the compiler simplified the imple-
mentation, as special typing rules did not have to be added to variables that were


















ThisRibbonAccess: Access ::= <ID:String>;
GetDomainAccess: Access ::=
<RibbonInstance:Expr> <DomainName:Access>;
Figure 4.1.: AST extensions for RibbonJ compiler. The new AST nodes declaratively
sub-class Java 5 AST nodes. AST definitions follow the form TypeName: SuperType-
Name ::= list of child nodes. Unbracketed terms denote a child AST node of the
given AST node type. Straight brackets denote optional child nodes. Angle brackets
denote typed tokens. A star after a term indicates a list of child nodes of that type.
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implementation, where protection domains are modeled as objects that implement a
well defined protection domain interface.
The strategy was similar for ribbon declarations. They are modeled in the AST
as a class declaration that also specifies the protection domain parameters for ribbon
construction. Unlike protection domains, ribbon declarations are equivalent to class
declarations in that they are specifically declaration a new java class and can contain
any class declaration body term that a normal class declaration can. The two im-
portant di↵erences are that the supertype of all ribbons is implicitly defined and also
ribbon declarations must specify their protection domain construction parameters.
The RibbonClassInstanceExpr AST node is used to model both (a) the use
of the extended new operator that allows specification of the protection domain that
the new object should be allocated within, and (b) the use of the new operator to
instantiate a new ribbon, which requires the use of the where clause and specification
of the values for the protection domain parameters. For cases where the extended
new operator is used to instantiate a normal class (without use of the where clause),
the parser initializes the WithinList child node to be empty.
Additionally, new AST nodes are defined to represent the use of the new expres-
sions thisribbon and getdomain.
The JastAddJ compiler uses the Beaver [1] LALR parser generator framework.
Parser extensions are given through additional BNF-style rules with attached Java
code enclosed in special brackets {: and :}. The Java code attached to each BNF
expression is responsible for creating the AST nodes from the parsed input. BNF rules
previously defined can be extended with additional alternate forms by declaring rules
with the same rule name (on the left hand side). This allows modular specification
of the additional parsing rules for RibbonJ separately from the parsing rules for
Java itself. The parsing logic required to construct the AST for RibbonJ features
was straightforward and directly followed from the grammar and the AST. Figure 4.2




LPAREN ribbon_within_type_list.l? RPAREN class_body.b
{:
return new RibbonDecl(





{: return new List().add(i); :}
| ribbon_within_type_list.l COMMA ribbon_within_type.i






new Modifiers(m), t, id);
:}
;
Figure 4.2.: Example of a parsing rule in the RibbonJ compiler that extends the
JastAddJ parser for Java. This example shows parsing logic needed to parse ribbon
declarations. Note that it is extending the class_declaration BNF rule, allowing
precise specification of where this additional syntax should be allowed in the extended
language.
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Explicit typechecking rules were used to ensure that extended RibbonJ features
(such as privilege declarations and the use of the where keyword) only occur in
appropriate places. Most of the typechecking for the additional features of RibbonJ
is accomplished by the unmodified Java compiler as it type checks the program after
our AST rewriting phases have completed.
AST rewriting is used to implement most of the RibbonJ features in the compiler
frontend. The AST for protection domain declarations is rewritten into a standard
class declaration as follows:
• The class implicitly inherits from jikesrvm.runtime.ribbonj.
ProtectionDomain.
• A field is added for each protection domain parameter.
• The protection domain parameters become the formal arguments of an implic-
itly defined constructor.
• Code is added to the implicitly defined constructor to initialize the fields rep-
resenting the protection domain parameters to be the values passed as argu-
ments to the constructor. At the end of the constructor, a call is added to the
initDomain method to allow the implementation an opportunity to actually
create the protection domain.
Similarly, all privilege declarations inside a protection domain declaration are
transformed into a static initializer block on the class that adds a runtime repre-
sentation of the declared grant or require privilege to an internal list of privilege
declarations. This list of privilege declarations is used by the runtime implementation
inside the initDomain call when actually creating the protection domain and setting
up actual privileges.
Ribbon declarations also follow a similar strategy and they are rewritten into a
standard class declaration as follows:
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• The class implicitly inherits from jikesrvm.runtime.ribbonj.Ribbon.
• A field is added for each protection domain parameter.
• The protection domain parameters become the formal arguments of an implic-
itly defined method named initWithinDomainsTYPENAME (where TYPENAME
is the name of the ribbon type being declared).
• Code is added to the implicitly defined initWithinDomainsTYPENAME method
to initialize the fields representing the protection domain parameters with the
values from the formal arguments passed to the method. Additionally, the in-
ternal field internal_DefaultProtectionDomain is assigned to the value
of the first protection domain passed to the method. Each protection do-
main parameter value is also added to a list stored in an internal field named
livingWithinDomains, which is used by the runtime implementation. At the
end of the method a call to the method bootstrapRibbonAfterConstruct
in the superclass is inserted. This allows the runtime implementation to actu-
ally create the ribbon once all parameter values and internal fields have been
properly populated after object construction.
Finally, the thisribbon keyword is rewritten into a call to the static method
Ribbon.getCurrentRibbon(). getdomain is rewritten into a standard Java field
access where the first argument is the target of the field access and the second argu-
ment is the field name. This works properly because the protection domain arguments
of a ribbon are stored in public fields with the same name as the protection domain
argument.
4.1.2 Compiler Backend
Two features of RibbonJ could not be implemented via a direct AST trans-
formation into a normal Java program: (1) ribbon initialization after construction
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(implementation of the where clause), and (2) the extended new operator where the
protection domain that the new object should be allocated from is explicitly specified.
While these features could not be implemented through AST rewriting, they could
be implemented at the bytecode level in the compiler backend using standard Java
bytecodes. Thus, compiled RibbonJ programs are standard Java bytecode and do
not require any customizations to the Java bytecode standard itself.
The implementation of the where clause for ribbon construction is implemented
by inserting bytecodes to implement the logic for the where clause after the new
ribbon object is constructed. These implementation bytecodes evaluate each of
the arguments in the where clause, followed by bytecode for a method call to the
initWithinDomainsTYPENAME method.
Java bytecode has a stack-based evaluation model where expressions become val-
ues on an operand stack. After the construction of the new ribbon object, a reference
to the new object is on the top of the operand stack. As each argument in the
where clause is evaluated, it results in the final resulting value for the argument’s
expression to be placed on the top of the operand stack. Finally, the call to the
initWithinDomainsTYPENAME method consumes all of these argument values from
the operand stack. As the initWithinDomainsTYPENAME method has no return
value, the operand stack is returned to the state where it was immediately after the
new ribbon object was constructed. This allows the value of the entire new expression
for ribbon construction to still evaluate to the new ribbon object itself, while still al-
lowing the information in the where clause to contain complex expressions and then
be passed to the internal method that receives these values and finishes constructing
the ribbon.
The implementation of the extended new operator requires a di↵erent approach.
In this case, the runtime implementation will need to know the value of the protection
domain that the new object should be allocated within. The new Java bytecode only
passes the type of the object that should be allocated and nothing else. The construc-
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tors could be modified to receive the protection domain value, but by this point the
object is already allocated, and additionally it would require changing the type signa-
tures of all objects, also breaking compatibility. Instead, the compiler inserts bytecode
before the new operation that evaluates the protection domain value and then passes
the result to the static method ProtectionDomain.setNextAllocDomain. The
runtime implementation of this method stores the value passed to it in a thread-local
variable, and the next allocation on that thread then knows to use the specified pro-
tection domain. Each allocation resets this internal thread-local field to null, ensuring
that if the default new operator is used, the runtime implementation will know to al-
locate from the default protection domain associated with the currently executing
ribbon.
4.2 Language VM Implementation: JikesRVM
The ribbonization of JikesRVM involves:
• Enhancements of virtual memory address space abstractions to distinguish be-
tween memory managed by ribbons vs not managed by ribbons.
• Support for memory domains within the memory model of JikesRVM.
• Allocation path enhancements to support explicitly allocating within a specific
memory domain.
• Enhancements to the GC so it is aware of and performs GC within all memory
domains.
• Signal handling enhancements to support lazy mapping of the address space of
memory domains as well as a new trap for protection domain violations.
• Support for grouping threads into ribbons and the initiation of a new ribbon.
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• Enhancements to the JikesRVM boot loading process to ensure proper sharing
of data not directly managed by the ribbons C library.
• Other JikesRVM C runtime enhancements within the bootloader.
First, a brief background of the main concepts in JikesRVM is given.
4.2.1 JikesRVM Overview
JikesRVM [6] is a meta-circular Java virtual machine (JVM): the JVM itself is
written primarily in the Java language. It relies on a bootstrap Java VM to save to
disk an in-memory representation of the initial set of objects and the machine code
necessary for the VM to begin execution. The relevant machine code is generated
by the JikesRVM compiler classes as executed by the bootstrap JVM. A small C
bootloader program loads the code and data from disk and then transitions execution
to JikesRVM. From that point onwards, the JikesRVM class loader, compiler, and
supporting classes (whose code is pre-compiled into the JVM boot image) can then
load and compile any additional classes not included in the boot image. JikesRVM
includes a baseline compiler as well as an adaptive optimized compiler that recompiles
frequently executed methods on demand.
Memory management in JikesRVM is performed through a set of precise garbage
collection algorithms implemented in the MMTk toolkit [13]. MMTk models low level
memory concepts with high-level, extensible classes. The Mmapper class tracks virtual
address space allocation and OS mapping state. The Map class actually implements
the logic to map and unmap virtual memory regions. The Space base class represents
an abstraction that models page allocation, deallocation, and reservation. A Space
may represent a contiguous or discontiguous region of virtual memory, and is used to
divide the heap based on the di↵erent ways memory should be considered by garbage
collection algorithms and other VM subsystems. For example, a copying garbage
collector might have a “to” space and a “from” space that each represent contiguous
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regions of memory, which can be freed all at once after certain phases of garbage
collection. Sub-classes of Space can be defined to track additional properties of
memory regions as needed by the GC or the VM.
When a Space is constructed, it is given a VMRequest object, which models infor-
mation necessary when the space needs to allocate or free pages within the underlying
OS. Spaces acquire and release memory in 4MB chunks through the Mmapper and its
VMRequest instance. Spaces work in coordination with page resource objects (derived
from the PageResource base class), which are responsible for resource accounting
and distributing allocated pages within allocated chunks.
One Space used by all di↵erent configurations of JikesRVM is ImmortalSpace,
which contains objects that never need to be freed once allocated (certain kinds of
JVM metadata). Another commonly used sub-class of Space is LargeObjectSpace,
which contains only objects whose size is greater than a certain threshold, enabling the
JVM to optimize memory allocation and GC algorithms for large objects separately.
Two di↵erent instances of the same Space sub-class may model distinct types of
memory, such as compiled machine code vs heap space for Java objects.
The Allocator base class models logic required to fulfill thread-local allocation
and free requests of arbitrary sizes and alignments. An Allocator allocates and frees
memory in at least page-sized units from the Space that it is associated with. Com-
monly used allocators include BumpPointer and SegregatedFreeList. JikesRVM
also has a framework that allows for the specification of an allocation type “hint”
based on the type of the object being allocated or the code context of the allocation
(containing class or method). This allows for example the straightforward separation
of heap objects necessary for the internal operation of the JVM itself from objects
allocated by the application being executed.
The MutatorContext base class models behavior that is local to each mutator
thread. A mutator can represent either a single logical processor that multiplexes
the non-parallel execution of many logical threads (i.e., “green threads”), or more
66
typical for modern uses of JikesRVM, represents a single native OS thread of execution
that represents a single logical thread of execution within the Java program. This
class models any thread-local state, as well as JVM logic that is unsynchronized
(e.g., the “fast path” of allocation and barriers). Similarly, the CollectorContext
models the state and unsynchronized logic for each GC collector thread running within
the JVM. Global state and operations requiring synchronization are modeled by the
Plan base class. The specific instance of the Plan class also determines the concrete
instances of all other connected classes, including the actual concrete class instances
for MutatorContext, CollectorContext, Allocator, and Space, as well as how
these objects are structured and relate to each other. JikesRVM allows di↵erent build
configurations to be specified in a configuration file, including the name of the concrete
Plan sub-class that should be used to define the memory management strategy for
the JVM being compiled.
Both JikesRVM and MMTk rely heavily on the vmmagic [48] framework, which
allows high level languages to e ciently manipulate low level system constructs, such
as direct memory access. vmmagic provides classes in the org.vmmagic package
with (a) special types that represent underlying low level primitive words of di↵erent
sizes or types (e.g., 4-byte integer, 2-byte short, pointers, etc.), and (b) intrinsic
methods that have empty bodies whose signatures define low level operations, such
as storing or loading a word, or performing an atomic compare and swap. vmmagic
intrinsic methods are implemented as special cases inside the baseline and optimizing
compilers such that vmmagic methods are implemented not as function calls but as
inlined machine instructions. Use of vmmagic is critical for good performance within
a meta-circular VM written in a high level language such as Java.
4.2.2 Virtual Memory Address Space Changes
Ribbons support in JikesRVM is built on top of a lower-level C library, as detailed
in Section 4.3. This library only manages a specific portion of the virtual address
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space for a process. Thus, JikesRVM needed to track the sections of the virtual
address space being managed by ribbons, and only acquire or release ribbonized
sections of the virtual address space through the lower-level library. The Mmapper
class was modified to track whether or not each virtual memory address space region
is being managed by the ribbons library or not. The Map class and corresponding
PageResource classes were changed to use the ribbons library when appropriate, as
well as to optionally specify a specific “preferred address” for newly allocated regions
of the virtual address space. JikesRVM was also modified so that the entire virtual
address space of the process was not entirely mapped in during VM boot, but rather
a large section of the address space is reserved for management by the ribbons library,
and this section of the virtual address space is left unmapped initially.
4.2.3 Support for Memory Domains
The org.mmtk.vm.Memdom interface models the low-level ribbons library API
calls for memory domains. This interface is implemented by the internal Java class
org.jikesrvm.runtime.Memdom. Methods available in the Memdom interface in-
clude methods for adding, removing, and changing privileges, allocating and freeing
pages, and retrieving the opaque low-level API handle associated with the the Memdom
object.
The org.jikesrvm.runtime.ribbonj.ProtectionDomain class implements
the higher level protection domain semantics assumed by the RibbonJ compiler.
This class models the protection domain argument list, a list of require and grant
privileges, the internal Memdom it is associated with, and a list of ribbons that live
within this domain. This class is responsible for implementing the higher-level se-
mantics of protection domains in RibbonJ using the lower-level semantics provided
by memory domains in the lower layer, as follows:
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• When a new privilege is added to a protection domain, the corresponding privi-
lege is added between the corresponding memory domain and all ribbons living
within the protection domain.
• When a new protection domain is initialized (through the compiler-generated
call to initDomain) the list of require and grant privileges are enumerated
and added (if allowed by the isolation model) to the appropriate protection
domains.
• When a new ribbon is instantiated that should live within a specific protection
domain (“home ribbon”), if allowed, the underlying low-level ribbon is granted
all appropriate privileges to the memory domains associated with the protection
domains that the home ribbon has privileges onto.
Previously, JikesRVM assumed that a static number of spaces would be instanti-
ated at JVM startup, with the number and type depending upon the selected Plan
(and thus the selected GC algorithm). JikesRVM was modified to allow for an arbi-
trary number of spaces to be created at runtime, up to a certain statically defined
limit per MutatorContext. This allows each thread in each ribbon to associate with
di↵erent memory domains, as determined by the ribbon it is operating within. In
RibbonJ each ribbon is associated with a fixed number of protection domains (as
determined by ribbon types), so this approach was su cient in order to implement
RibbonJ and simplified memory domain lookup code in the allocation path.
Each memory domain is modeled as one or more distinct Space objects. How
many Space objects are constructed for each memory domain is determined by the
GC plan selected (e.g., a generational GC would need at least two Space objects for
each memory domain). The current implementation extends the standard mark-sweep
GC, which only requires one concrete Space object for each memory domain.
To enable Space objects to be associated with a specific runtime memory do-
main, a new type of vmRequest was added that allows specification of a specific
org.mmtk.vm.Memdom that the Space should use for allocation and free requests.
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4.2.4 Allocation Path Changes
The allocation path in JikesRVM was enhanced to support allocation of objects
within di↵erent memory domains, including the ability to choose which memory do-
main to allocate within when constructing a new Java object. As described in Sec-
tion 4.1.2, the extended new operator that allows explicit specification of the memory
domain to allocate within is compiled into a call to the setNextAllocDomain static
method in the ProtectionDomain class. This call modifies thread-local data that
was added to the MutatorContext to track if the next object allocation was for a
specific protection domain. This thread-local field is reset to null after each alloca-
tion. Additionally, each thread explicitly remembers the “default” protection domain
to use for allocation, which allows for simpler code in the allocation fast path where
an object is being allocated from the default protection domain. Keeping the code
size of the allocation fast path small is critical to ensure good performance because
object allocation in Java is so common, and increasing the code size of the fast allo-
cation path causes code size bloat (reducing the amount of a program that fits into a
CPU’s L1 code cache), hampers inlining (both directly and indirectly), and increases
register pressure.
A new allocation type “hint” was added, ALLOC_ALLOW_MEMDOM, that indicates
the allocation is being made from within a context where allocating from a specific
memory domain is possible (as determined by object type or lexical context). This
allocation hint is only used for allocations made from within the context of actual
user applications. This ensures that allocation of VM internal objects are actually
allocated within VM internal spaces (rather than within a space within a specific
application-specific memory domain), and also enables the use of an unmodified fast
allocation path for allocation of internal VM objects.
In JikesRVM the MutatorContext class models each running application thread
wherein there is one thread-local segregated free-list allocator (MarkSweepLocal)
associated with the application’s main space. This scheme was modified so that each
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thread can support up to N allocators (e.g., N = 16) – one for each Space associated
with the memory domains used by that thread. For speed this is implemented by
a fixed-size table mapping memory domains to allocator instances. The table is ini-
tially populated with MarkSweepLocal allocators that are unused and not associated
with any Space. These pre-allocated allocator instances will later be bound in the
allocation slow path to an appropriate Space object before being used.
Upon allocation, in the fast path where the default memory domain is being
used for allocation, the allocation code remains unchanged and allocates from the
MutatorContext’s main allocator object that is associated with the default memory
domain of the ribbon. In the slow path for allocating from a specific memory domain,
the memory domain to allocator instance mapping table is linearly scanned to find
the allocator associated with memory domain of the allocation request. If it is not
found, a check is made to ensure the thread’s ribbon has the inject privilege on the
target memory domain. If the privilege check passes, one of the pre-allocated allocator
instances is then attached to the space associated with the requested memory domain,
and the allocation mapping table for the thread is updated. Certain JVM runtime
features also require being able to map a Space back to its corresponding thread-local
Allocator for a given MutatorContext, so the getAllocatorFromSpace method
was enhanced to understand and search the memory domain to allocator instance
mapping table.
This strategy removes the need to check for the appropriate inject privilege on
every single object allocation and is key to good performance. Under the semantics
of RibbonJ, once a ribbon has the inject privileges to allocate within a given
protection domain, the privilege is never revoked. Thus, the entries in the thread-local
mapping tables always remain valid once created. Also note that the pre-allocation
of allocator objects avoids a chicken-and-egg type problem that would otherwise arise
in the allocation slow path when the slow path needs a new allocator instance in
order to satisfy an allocation within a memory domain that the thread has never
used before. The allocation path in JikesRVM is marked as “Uninterruptible”, which
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enables certain compiler optimizations, and is thus not allowed to allocate any new
Java objects using the new operator, including VM internal objects.
4.2.5 GC Enhancements
The current implementation extends the non-compacting mark-sweep GC plan.
Using a non-moving GC algorithm allows objects to properly remain within the mem-
ory domain they were originally allocated within without having to execute individual
compacting phases for each memory domain.
The modular design of JikesRVM made extending the GC to support dynami-
cally created memory domains (and thus dynamically created spaces) straightforward.
JikesRVM divides the GC process into several phases, and allows the participation of
the relevant memory management objects in each phase of the GC, including spaces,
allocators, collection contexts, and mutator contexts. The mutator context is re-
sponsible for notifying each space of a GC phase, so this was enhanced to notify all
dynamically created spaces associated with memory domains. Likewise, logic to trace
a specific object instance is sometimes delegated to the space that contains the object,
depending on the type of the space. Tracing was thus enhanced to properly discover
the space that contains the object even for objects in dynamically created spaces.
The GC itself operates within a ribbon that has privileges to all memory domains
within the JVM. Free pages identified by the GC are freed from their corresponding
memory domain as appropriate.
4.2.6 Signal Handling Enhancements
Each ribbon within the process maintains its own page table and page directo-
ries (threads within the same ribbon share the same page table). When one ribbon
performs an allocation that causes a particular memory domain to capture another
portion of the virtual address space of the process (which is shared by all ribbons),
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either (a) all other ribbons that have privileges on that memory domain must imme-
diately map in that additional section of the virtual address space, or (b) the mapping
can be performed on demand (“lazy”), only after an attempted access by a ribbon to
that area of the address space. Lazy mapping enables memory allocation to remain
more loosely synchronized: the virtual address space itself is a shared resource and
must still be protected by a lock when address range reservations are made; however,
lazy mapping does avoid logic having to be executed in every ribbon every time a
new reservation is made. The virtual address space reservation lock itself is rarely
contended, as new reservations are made in at least chunks of 4MB regions.
In order to support lazy mapping, the JikesRVM SIGSEGV signal handler was
enhanced to (a) check if a particular address is managed by the lower-level ribbons
library, (b) if so, perform a privilege check to determine if the current ribbon has
privileges on the memory domain that contains the faulting virtual address, and (c)
if the current ribbon does have privileges, to map in that page (and opportunistically
map in surrounding pages in the same memory domain) and restart the faulting
instruction. Additionally, if the current ribbon does not have privileges on the relevant
memory domain, then the signal handler generates a new TRAP_MEMDOM_VIOLATION
trap. This trap is handled within the RuntimeEntrypoints class and is converted
into an exception being thrown of type Memdom.ViolationException.
As an example of what happens during a privilege violation, the Master/Worker
example was modified to reference memory that it should not have privileges for.
A modification was made so that the Worker attempted to write to the queue data






4.2.7 Support for Ribbons
The org.mmtk.vm.Ribbon interface models the low-level ribbons library API
calls for managing actual runtime ribbons. This interface is implemented by the Java
class org.jikesrvm.runtime.Ribbon. Methods in the Ribbon interface include
methods to join or leave a memory domain, to start a new ribbon given an initial
thread, and to get the Ribbon object representing the currently executing ribbon.
The implementation also includes a hashmap for quickly mapping a low-level ribbons
API opaque handle representing a ribbon into its corresponding Ribbon object (and
vice versa), which is required to e ciently implement certain callbacks from the low-
level ribbons API (e.g., during ribbon startup).
The org.jikesrvm.runtime.ribbonj.Ribbon Java class implements the Rib-
bonJ semantics for a ribbon using support provided by the lower-level Java class
org.mmtk.vm.Ribbon. The higher level Ribbon class tracks which protection do-
mains the ribbon is living within and which low-level memory domains (Memdom in-
stances) the ribbon has joined. The Ribbon class also supports ribbon initialization
by implementing the method bootstrapRibbonAfterConstruct, which is called by
the backend compiler to implement support for the where clause in RibbonJ. This
method notifies the relevant protection domains that the new ribbon is attempting
to join onto it (if it has the proper privileges).
Additionally, thread startup and bootstrap were modified within the RVMThread
class and the underlying C JikesRVM library to understand the ribbon concept by
adding a new “ribbon initialization” mode for thread creation that uses the ribbon C
library instead of pthreads when starting a ribbon. Care must be taken at ribbon
startup to avoid issues: a new ribbon begins running with almost none of its virtual
address space mapped in (new ribbons often have much fewer privileges than its parent
ribbon, so this ensures it will not have access to memory that it should not). A new
ribbon therefore immediately joins the JikesRVM global memory domain, re-installs
all of the JikesRVM signal handlers (the OS does not automatically clone these for a
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new ribbon), and then immediately sets a temporary stack for the SIGSEGV handler
that is based on a region on its own stack. This prevents hard crashes that would
be caused otherwise if the SIGSEGV handler is triggered while the ribbon is still
bootstrapping to lazily map in a region of the virtual address space in the JikesRVM
global memory domain and the stack itself for the signal handler is not yet mapped
in.
With this in place, a call is made to the ribbons C library to immediately map
in all pages belonging to the JikesRVM global memory domain, which is required
because the JikesRVM SIGSEGV handler can actually attempt to allocate memory
on some code paths, which can trigger additional accesses to the global memory
domain, and thereby cause a recursive trap and thus a hard crash. Once all pages
from the JikesRVM global memory domain are mapped in, it is safe to reset the
stack of the SIGSEGV signal handler to its normal value and then pass control to
sysThreadStartup, allowing the first thread in the new ribbon to begin execution.
4.2.8 JikesRVM Boot Loading Changes
JikesRVM uses a relatively small C program to load the JikesRVM boot image
(containing the bootstrapped compiled code and object representations of the objects
needed for the VM to begin execution) into memory and then jump to the Java
boot method entrypoint. This C bootloader was enhanced to initialize the ribbons
C library, explicitly specifying the address range that should be managed by the
ribbons C library for the use of memory domains. To avoid conflicts with the C
memory allocation library, the bootloader requests using the C malloc call a very
large contiguous block of memory (as memory is actually allocated only upon first
access in Linux, this does not have negative ramifications, but only reserves a section
of the virtual address space). Thus, the C malloc library believes that the returned
region of memory has been allocated, and will avoid the region for future allocations,
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and thereby will not return an address that is being managed by the ribbons C library.
The C bootloader also creates the JikesRVM global memory domain.
Once execution control passes into the Java layer of JikesRVM, housekeeping tasks
are performed during the subsequent VM boot process, including the allocation and
setup of initial Memdom, ProtectionDomain, and Ribbon objects that correspond
to the JikesRVM global memory domain and the initial ribbon.
4.2.9 JikesRVM C Runtime Changes
Once the JikesRVM C bootstrap program has initialized ribbons, all JikesRVM C
code avoids the direct use of malloc, free, and other C memory management library
functions. Instead, these are replaced by alternate functions (e.g., jikesrvm_malloc)
that instead redirect allocation and other memory management functions so that they
are using the JikesRVM global memory domain instead of the heap managed by the
C library. The stacks for new threads are explicitly allocated from the global memory
domain to avoid pthread relying on the C heap for allocation. Likewise, the JikesRVM
syscalls that allocated additional pages for the JVM use allocation from the global
memory domain (unless a memory domain is explicitly specified) instead of direct OS
syscalls for mapping and unmapping pages.
When the ribbons C library is initialized, it remaps all code and data segments in
memory loaded by the OS process loader so that they are on shared memory pages
instead of private memory pages. From that point forward, JikesRVM is careful to al-
ways use the global memory domain, to ensure that global state is accessible and is the
same across all ribbons. JikesRVM support for dynamically loading shared libraries
(through dlopen) was modified so that after the new shared library was opened by
the OS, all code and data segments of the newly loaded shared library are remapped
onto shared pages. Additionally, support for fork and exec within the Classpath
runtime library was patched to return an error, as the userspace implementation does
not support forking a process with multiple ribbons.
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The BootRecord and Syscall classes were modified to support the additional
C-level JikesRVM “syscalls” that then call into the lower-level ribbons C library.
The C syscalls that create pthread mutexes and condition variables were modi-
fied to create the pthread constructs with the PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED attribute.
From the perspective of the kernel, in the userspace implementation of ribbons, dif-
fering ribbons appear as di↵erent processes (as they do not share a page table). Thus,
supporting libraries such as pthreads need to avoid futex optimizations that only work
within the kernel when the primitives are used within the same process (as seen by
the kernel). Kernel level support for ribbons would remove this limitation.
4.3 Operating System Support on Linux
The higher-level functionality of RibbonJ implemented in JikesRVM depends on
a layer-level implementation written as a set of C libraries. While the system level
support ultimately belongs in the kernel, the functionality of POSIX and Linux APIs
make an initial user-space implementation possible.
4.3.1 Implementation Overview
The implementation strategy relies on POSIX shared memory along with the
mmap, mprotect, and clone1 system calls. Conceptually, the lower-level implemen-
tation consists of three concepts:
• A memory domain, which corresponds to an instantiated protection domain, is
a set of virtual memory pages.
• A ribbon is a container of threads.
• A privilege is a mapping between a memory domain and ribbon to a set of
actions (read, write, inject).
1A generalization of the fork system call used to spawn new threads.
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At process startup, a large section of the virtual address space is reserved for
management by the lower-level C library.2 A memory domain is a discontiguous
collection of pages within this reserved area. Allocation within each memory domain
is performed by a custom multi-pool allocator that is motivated by the Linux kernel
slab allocator in its design. The metadata describing memory domains, privileges, and
ribbons are kept in a special “control area” shared memory segment that is protected
by locks, ensuring that all ribbons within a process have the same view of the set of
memory domains, privileges, and ribbons.
A ribbon represents a separate and distinct set of privileges over the virtual ad-
dress space of the process it belongs to. In the user-space implementation, from the
perspective of the OS, each ribbon has a completely separate virtual address space
and set of page tables (as if each ribbon was its own process). The ribbons coordinate
presenting a single logical virtual address space (partitioned into memory domains)
to the upper-level application through synchronized use of the shared control area.
A ribbon is created (along with its first thread) by a system call to Linux’s clone.
The calling thread is cloned; however, a special set of flags are passed to indicate that
the new clone should not share the same virtual address space mappings but will
share all other properties (e.g., shared file table) with the creating thread. In this
way, a ribbon appears as another thread within the same process except that it can
control its own virtual memory mappings and permissions independently.
Privileges dictate specific actions that a ribbon can perform on the pages belonging
to each memory domain within the unified virtual address space. A page is termed
to be “unmapped” in a ribbon if that particular ribbon cannot currently access it,
even if the ribbon’s privileges permits the access. Likewise, a page is termed to be
“mapped” if a ribbon can currently access it. A ribbon uses the mprotect system call
to “map” and “unmap” pages. Throughout program execution, pages are mapped and
2The size of this area is configurable and may be larger than the amount of physical RAM in the
system. However, because of Linux’s on-demand paging and memory over-commit, each page in this
area is only actually allocated (from the perspective of the OS) on the first attempted write to the
page.
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unmapped from ribbons as needed to enforce the privileges and isolation properties
of given ribbon instance. Since modern hardware enforces memory permissions, the
overhead of privilege enforcement under normal usage (mappings already established
and page tables stable) is non-existent. Overhead is also minimal during the mapping,
unmapping, creation, and destruction of ribbons, memory domains, and privileges, as
a single syscall can update enforced privileges at the granularity of a page, or more
frequently at the granularity of large chunks of pages (e.g., 4MB chunks).
4.3.2 Growing and Shrinking Memory Domains
As a memory domain grows (or shrinks) it allocates (or releases) pages from the
reserved area of the virtual address space claimed at startup. Accesses to this area
are synchronized such that no two memory domains are allowed to allocate the same
section of virtual address space. This enforces the semantics that all ribbons within
the same process share the same logical view of the virtual address space of a process,
even if each ribbon has a di↵erent set of privileges over di↵erent sections of the address
space.
During execution, a memory domain can grow (by claiming pages from the re-
served area) when a ribbon attempts to allocate a block of memory from a domain
and there is no room on prior pages reserved for that memory domain. These ad-
ditional pages will subsequently become a part of the address space dedicated to a
particular memory domain, and then will be immediately mapped into the address
space for the currently executing ribbon that is performing the allocation.
However, another ribbon may also have access privileges to this memory domain
but will be unaware of the change (it would see the updated metadata in the control
area if it checked; however, the ribbon may be executing within the application’s
code and control will not be within the ribbon library in order for it to check all the
time). The pages in this other ribbon would still be unmapped. Rather than rely
on signals or some other form of forced interruption or notification, the new pages
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within an extended memory domain remain unmapped (except within the ribbon
that caused the memory domain to be extended). When a ribbon tries to access an
unmapped page the hardware generates a fault causing the OS to issue a SIGSEGV
signal. Normally, this signal results in the termination of the process, but a custom
signal handler is installed instead. When invoked, special code checks to see if a
ribbon has access privileges to this area. If so, this page and opportunistically its
surrounding pages are mapped into the current ribbon. If the ribbon does not have
privileges on the memory domain that contains the faulting address, an error is raised
instead.
This type of “on-demand” mapping technique is prevalent in system implementa-
tions and optimizes for the common case where the overhead of extending the size of
a memory domain in one ribbon only needs to be paid in other ribbons if and when
the other ribbons actually access the newly allocated areas of the memory domain.
In this way, the overhead depends on the locality of data access patterns within a
single ribbon only, rather than within the entire process.
Likewise, should a ribbon’s actions cause a memory domain to shrink by returning
pages to the reserved area, these pages may still be mapped in another ribbon. In the
present implementation, the ability to shrink the address space of memory domains
is not directly addressed, as a kernel level implementation would be better equipped
to handle this e ciently. A user-space implementation could implement support for
shrinking the address space of memory domains either through forced signaling (would
cause several context switches in all relevant ribbons when a memory domain shrunk)
or through a “soft handshake” mechanism wherein ribbons periodically check a shared
free queue, and address space regions in the freed queue can only be reclaimed by
an expanding memory domain after all relevant ribbons have had an opportunity to
process the shared free queue to that point in time (an epoch based system is common
for e ciently handling this kind of loose synchronization). Throughout the evaluation
of the user-space implementation the lack of support for shrinking memory domains
did not cause an issue.
80
4.3.3 Isolation Properties
A limitation of implementing ribbon support in user-space is that isolation only
strongly applies to the “JIT-ed” Java bytecode, which herein is termed as untrusted
code. It is assumed that all native code is inherently trusted. Thus, any untrusted
code must not be allowed to invoke native (JNI) method calls that are not known
to be trusted (e.g., part of the class library implementation). This can be enforced
by either the JIT compiler or by the class loader. Further care is taken to protect
the shared control area that contains the metadata for ribbons, memory domains,
and privileges. The pages where this metadata exist are unmapped from all ribbons
during normal execution, and only mapped in during certain critical sections of the
library code. This provides some protection against untrusted native code that is
benign yet erroneous and attempts to inadvertently modify the shared control area.
In order for isolation to be guaranteed for native code in addition to higher-level Java
code, there must be support for ribbons natively in the kernel, which is outside the
scope of this dissertation.
4.3.4 Bootstrapping the First Ribbon
In the implementation strategy, POSIX shared memory is explicitly used for all
memory managed by memory domains. However, multithreaded applications expect
that global variables (stored in the data segment of a process) and other global sec-
tions of the virtual address space of a process are shared between all threads. The
ELF process loader in Linux maps in these areas using private mappings, which al-
lows e cient memory mapped IO on demand (rather than having to read all pages
from a program’s file on disk into memory immediately) to speed the initial loading
time of a program. However, these private mappings are not compatible with the
approach where each ribbon is a clone of its parent ribbon so that it can manage its
own virtual address space and page tables (any privately mapped pages get copy on
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write semantics in a clone call).3 Read-only text (code) segments do not need to be
remapped, only writeable pages that are expected to be shared across the process.
To overcome this, when a ribbonized process is first initializing the ribbon library
first analyzes the address space of the process to identify all writable segments so that
these pages of memory can be remapped as shared memory segments. The pages that
need to be re-mapped are first identified using the special C variables etext (address
of end of text segment), edata (address of end of data segment), and end (address
of end of uninitialized data segment).
It is not possible to ask the operating system to re-map the private memory
mapped IO pages as shared memory pages – doing so requires unmapping the pages
first and thus would crash the program. However, it is also not possible to simply copy
the appropriate data segments from the old location to a new location in memory –
the loader performs address fixups in the code segment specific to the exact virtual
addresses where the code segment was loaded, and performing relocation logic again
would introduce large amounts of complexity. Instead, the simpler strategy used in
the implementation is to first copy all of the relevant data into a specially allocated
“trampoline” area of memory, remap the original areas of memory as shared, and
then copy data from the trampoline area back into the original areas. However, there
are a number of subtleties in the implementation that are required in order for this
to work:
• The code itself that is performing the copy and remap operations must not be
in the region of the virtual address space that is being unmapped. Otherwise,
the program immediately crashes as soon as the original address space is un-
mapped. This is worked around by (a) bu↵ering the bootstrapping code with
enough read-only code segments on either side to ensure that the page exclu-
sively contains read-only code segments and is not a candidate for re-mapping
3Note that with kernel-level support for ribbons, these pages would not have to be re-mapped at
all, because when a new ribbon was created by the OS it would know that the originally loaded
data/text segments should be part of the global memory domain of the process.
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under most circumstances, and (b) putting the ribbon initialization code into a
shared library. Shared library memory segments are remapped in a later phase
of the bootstrapping process, and
• Certain C runtime library calls use a relocation table the first time a function
is called to lazily resolve references to dynamically loaded functions. Any of the
C functions used in the remapping code function (e.g., mmap) must be called at
least once before the operation begins. This ensures that the program will still
be able to use the relocation data in the data segments of a loaded process to
resolve the functions required for the remapping operation to succeed.
• In some cases, di↵erent process sections are not loaded contiguously next to
other but have unmapped pages separating di↵erent sections. The information
provided by the etext, edata, and end variables do not provide su cient
information to identify these “holes” in the valid address space. Thus, a custom
SIGSEGV signal handler is installed during the bootstrapping process to ignore
access attempts to any of these invalid address regions.
Once the main section of the process has been correctly prepared for ribbonization,
any writeable data pages that belong to shared libraries must also be re-mapped onto
shared pages. The same challenges exist in that the virtual address space of the
data pages must be the same at the end of the remapping operation in order to
retain full functionality of shared libraries without requiring them to be modified.
It is especially critical for the data segments of the pthread shared library to be
re-mapped – otherwise, thread information will begin to diverge in di↵erent ribbons,
breaking the semantics that ribbons act as if they are within the same process.
The problem is addressed by having a second-phase remapping process that exe-
cutes (a) after the first-phase of bootstrapping, and (b) after any dlopen call is made
to load additional shared libraries at runtime. The second-phase process parses the
information that the Linux kernel exposes in the procfs filesystem for the current
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process in the /proc/(PID)/maps pseudo-file. This file exposes detailed information
about all memory segments of a process created during the loading of shared libraries.
The parsed information is then used to perform a copy–remap–copy-back operation
as is performed in the first phase for the main program segments.
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5 EVALUATION
This chapter analyzes the performance characteristics of the ribbon C library and
the ribbonized version of JikesRVM through standard and synthetic benchmarks.
Additionally, two widely used applications of notable size, Apache Tomcat and Apache
httpd, are ribbonized and changes in performance are analyzed. Qualitative insights
are also given into the complexity of the e↵ort required to ribbonize these applications.
5.1 Performance Evaluation
In this section the performance of the ribbonized version of JikesRVM is evaluated
by comparing the performance of the version of JikesRVM that we started with (SVN
version 15779) to the ribbonized version.
5.1.1 Microbenchmark Design
A synthetic microbenchmark was designed in order to study the performance over-
head of the underlying ribbons C library that supports the full ribbonized JikesRVM
without encountering the additional overhead caused by the modified allocation path
and ribbonized garbage collector.
The original version of JikesRVM was modified for this benchmark so that it was
only changed to support new JikesRVM syscalls to the underlying ribbons C library
and to bootstrap support for ribbons at startup (it did not have any allocation path or
GC changes). For the synthetic benchmark the master/worker example of Chapter 2
was implemented using direct JikesRVM syscalls to the ribbons C library.
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Queue throughput was evaluated for both the ribbonized version of JikesRVM
and the unmodified version of JikesRVM. In the benchmark the queue items consist
of raw byte arrays of varying sizes. The queue is prepopulated with enough worker
items to fill 32 MB of memory. The master produces an item by copying the array
data into the appropriate worker item in the queue. A worker consumes an item
by copying the array data out of the queue item and into a work bu↵er, and then
sums up all of the bytes in the worker item. As the purpose of the benchmark is
to measure the overhead for ribbonized memory access, the benchmark was designed
to be memory-bound as opposed to being CPU-bound, hence worker items do not
perform significant computational work when consuming each item—only enough to
ensure all bytes are accessed from memory.
Synchronization over the queue itself is handled through the built in Java object
synchronization language feature as implemented by JikesRVM. Waiting for new work
within worker threads is implemented through busy waiting rather than through wait
and notify calls—it was discovered that busy waiting was approximately twice as
fast as wait/notify for this benchmark for both versions of JikesRVM (at least on
this particular system for this type of CPU). This is not unexpected as the common
case for this benchmark is that each worker will always have work waiting for it to
process, so very little CPU cycles are wasted actually doing busy waiting.
A separate ribbon was created for the master thread and each of the worker
threads. Two protection domains were used – one for the queue control area, which
both the master and workers had read/write access to, and another for the queue
data, which the master had read/write access to but the workers only had read access
to. To run the benchmark within the unmodified version of JikesRVM, an identical
copy of the benchmark was used except that (a) new threads were spawned instead
of new ribbons and (b) memory was acquired through the JikesRVM memory map
syscall instead of through the ribbons C library.
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Figure 5.1.: Throughput in items processed per second for the non-ribbonized and
ribbonized (lower-layer only) versions of JikesRVM.
Figure 5.2.: Throughput in MB processed per second for the non-ribbonized and
ribbonized (lower-layer only) versions of JikesRVM.
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The microbenchmarks were executed on a 2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon E5462
with 2 GB of RAM, running Linux kernel Ubuntu 2.6.28-16-generic SMP x86 64.
Each data point represents the mean over 5 runs. Confidence intervals are given at
99%. One master ribbon (or thread) and three worker ribbons (or threads) were
created. This gave maximum performance on this hardware platform vs 2 worker
ribbons or 4 worker ribbons (the same was also true for the number of worker threads
for the variant of the benchmark run by the unmodified version of JikesRVM).
5.1.2 Microbenchmark Results
The queue item size was varied from 4 bytes to 1 MB to trade o↵ between higher
and lower synchronization overheads. Performance data was collected for the un-
modified version of JikesRVM vs the ribbonized (lower-layer only) JikesRVM using
lazy mapping and with metadata protection enabled (the recommended and default
configuration). Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present the results of the benchmark.
In all cases the mean performance of the each system is within the confidence
interval of the other system. The performance of the ribbonized version (lower-layer
only) of JikesRVM when lazy mapping was disabled was also statistically identical to
these results. This is not unexpected as all of the memory pages are soon accessed at
the start of the benchmark and the lazy mapping overhead on first access to a page
is amortized to near zero among the millions of memory accesses over the course of
the benchmark.
5.1.3 Methods and Benchmarks
Overhead was evaluated using the DaCapo benchmark suite [14] (version 2006-
10-MR21). Additionally, lusearch was ribbonized to use 32 ribbons instead of 32




threads (lusearch-rib). The synthentic master/worker microbenchmark of the
prior section was also reimplemented using pure Java objects (rather than directly
using JikesRVM syscalls to the lower layer ribbons C library and using raw byte
bu↵ers). This allows for comparison of the additional overheads added for this mi-
crobenchmark from the higher layer of the ribbonization of JikesRVM.
The benchmarks in this section were run on a dedicated system with a 6-core AMD
Phenom II 1090T CPU with 8 GB DDR3 RAM, running Gentoo Linux 2.6.36 SMP.
JikesRVM was configured with the mark-sweep GC with the optimizing compiler. It
was also configured to run with a fixed heap size and to use 6 threads for parallel GC
(one per core). To avoid variations introduced by the adaptive optimization system
(AOS), AOS was disabled and loaded classes were immediately compiled by the fully
optimizing compiler on first access. (Note that with AOS turned on the observed
results were also similar.)
Three JVMs were evaluated: (1) unmodified JikesRVM (2) ribbonized JikesRVM
with lazy mapping (termed RibbonRVM-lazy), and (3) ribbonized JikesRVM where
all pages are immediately mapped in upon allocation (termed RibbonRVM-nolazy).
Ten benchmark iterations were performed. Each iteration executed all benchmarks,
running all 3 JVMs for the same benchmark back to back. Alternating JVMs and
benchmarks between iterations minimizes bias due to systematic disturbance. In each
benchmark run, two warmup runs of the benchmark were taken (without the JVM
restarting) to allow all methods to be fully compiled and for the system to reach a
stable state before the timed run began. All data points represent the mean over 10
iterations and are given with 99% t-test confidence intervals.
5.1.4 Benchmark Results
Figure 5.3 presents the wall-clock running times for the benchmarks. No significant
overhead is observed for antlr, hsqldb, and xalan. The overhead of most other
























































Figure 5.3.: Wall-clock running times for the benchmarks. Times are normalized to
the running time of the original version of JikesRVM.
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seem to correlate with observed overhead. The overhead for the parallel benchmarks
(mw, hsqldb, lusearch, xalan) varies widely. Additionally, the outlier is jython
(single threaded benchmark), with an overhead of 10%.
The overhead on the DaCapo benchmarks (except for lusearch-rib) cannot be
due to additional memory mapping, page faults, or context switching caused by rib-
bonization, because these benchmarks are still running within the context of a single
ribbon. For DaCapo performance overheads are caused more by the additional com-
plexities introduced into the fast allocation path. Currently the RibbonJ compiler
uses a thread-local field (in the MutatorContext instances) to store which protection
domain a new object should be allocated within (note that this field is only set if a
non-default domain is used for allocation). The fast allocation path must retrieve this
additional field and also reset it after the allocation. There is also an additional con-
ditional to test if a non-default protection domain needs to be used for allocation. To
further substantiate the above theory, we removed the thread-local field accesses from
the fast allocation path and the overhead on jython lowered to 6%. However, when
we instead removed the extra conditional, performance on jython did not improve.
Comparing results for the mw benchmark in the completely ribbonized version of
JikesRVM to the ribbonized version of JikesRVM that only has lower-layer ribbons
support produces some interesting insights. Recall that in the microbenchmark results
when only the lower-layer was implemented, no statistically significant overhead was
observed. In the fully ribbonized version of the microbenchmark for the case of the
512-byte item size, a slowdown of 3% was observed. This overhead is caused by the
increased complexity of the allocation path for objects being allocated as part of
the loop that retrieves the next work item from the queue. For this case, this cost
is relatively significant compared to the work performed processing the item. This
additional overhead becomes negligent for the other two item size cases.
For the medium item size (4KB), results were not statistically significantly di↵er-
ent. Notably, for the 1MB item size case performance actually consistently improves.
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We re-ran this case (another 15 iterations), and the results were consistent (5% im-
provement). One theory to explain this performance increase is that because ribbons
are treated as processes instead of as threads the scheduling (by the kernel) is more
favorable in this case. Another possibility is that ribbons slightly changes the vir-
tual address memory layout of the JVM, which could a↵ect caching behaviors (as
cachegrind and other tools do not support our special use of the clone system call,
it is di cult to better substantiate this theory). This benchmark on a machine with a
di↵erent configuration (Dual 2.8 GHz Quad Core Intel Xeon) produced an overhead
of 2% to 3% instead. This supports the theory that virtual address space layout
di↵erences and how these di↵erences interact with the cache hierarchy of the underly-
ing CPU can a↵ect the results of this particular benchmark within a few percentage
points in either direction.
The lusearch-rib benchmark runs with 32 ribbons and measures overhead from
all factors, since it performs significant object allocation and is highly concurrent.
lusearch had the most overhead of any parallel benchmark in the threaded version,
and it is also the most concurrent benchmark. Thus, overhead of ribbonization is
likely to be the highest of any of the parallel benchmarks. Overhead for lusearch
was just over 12%, highlighting potential for future performance optimizations in
tandem with kernel-level support for ribbons.
Figures 5.4–5.7 present a breakdown of the running time overheads for the bench-
marks separately by the time spent in mutator threads/ribbons vs the time spent
during garbage collection. This allows for separate analysis of the overheads caused
by the more complex allocation path vs the increased complexity of object tracing
(determining the spaces that belong to traced objects) during garbage collection.
Some benchmarks such as mw, antlr, and fop were able to execute within the
heap size without any garbage collection taking place during the actual benchmark
run (excluding startup work such as work done by the optimizing compiler). The allo-



























Figure 5.4.: Normalized wall-clock running times for the mutator portion of execution




























Figure 5.5.: Normalized wall-clock running times for the garbage collection portion



























Figure 5.6.: Normalized wall-clock running times for the mutator portion of execution




























Figure 5.7.: Normalized wall-clock running times for the garbage collection portion
of execution for the second half of the benchmarks.
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eclipse, jython, luindex, lusearch, and xalan benchmarks. For these bench-
marks, the normalized overhead within garbage collection is further away from the
mean overall overhead than mutator overhead, yet does not significantly change the
overall mean overhead. This is especially pronounced for lusearch and xalan, where
GC overheads were 16% to 22%, but overall overhead was only 6% (lusearch) or
0% (xalan). For hsqldb, there is no runtime overhead in GC—deviations are only
seen within the mutator (and the deviations are not statistically significant).
This indicates that even though finding which space a traced object belongs to
during GC adds non-trivial overhead, GC runs are relatively infrequent compared to
the frequency of execution of the more complex allocation path. Future work should
thus first focus on optimizing the allocation path before optimizing object tracing.
5.2 Small-scale Refactoring Experiences
Certain smaller-scale applications were refactored in order to gain experience using
RibbonJ in practice before attempting to refactor larger more complex applications.
Notable findings from these early refactorings are presented in this section.
The master/worker example was implemented in 291 lines of Java. Ribbonizing
this program to isolate each worker required changing 23 lines of code (13 lines for
protection domains, 2 lines for ribbons, 3 lines for changed allocation sites, and 5 for
changes to threads). The lusearch DaCapo benchmark was also ribbonized, but in
this case not to add any isolation properties but rather solely to introduce ribbons
into the benchmark to understand performance changes. For this benchmark, only 3
lines of code had to be changed (1 line for the ribbon declaration, 2 to instantiate the
ribbon instead of the thread).
jIRCd2 is an open source Java IRC daemon, consisting of 9,556 lines of code and
121 classes. A two-tier isolation model was applied to the application wherein each
2http://j-ircd.sourceforge.net/
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connection operates within its own protection domain, and there is a global protection
domain for shared state. Ribbonization required 19 lines of code. Most of the client-
specific state was allocated in just a few places, so using the appropriate default
protection domain for each ribbon allowed us to keep modification of allocation sites
to a minimum.
Note that despite the significant di↵erence in size between the master/worker
example (291 lines) and jIRCd (9,556), the code changes required to ribbonize the
application is about the same (23 lines vs 19 lines). For these relatively smaller
applications, it is clear that the complexity of ribbonization is not determined by
program size but rather determined by how “cleanly” the heap can be segmented
into “classes” of objects (in this case, isolation classes).
To understand whether this principle extends onto more industrial-strength appli-
cations, two well known and complex applications were ribbonized: Apache Tomcat
and Apache httpd.
5.3 Apache Tomcat Ribbonization
This section presents the results of ribbonizing the Apache Tomcat web server.
The required minor program extensions are discussed, and the performance of the
ribbonized version compared to the original one is analyzed.
5.3.1 Apache Tomcat Overview
Tomcat is a web server implementing the Java Servlet and JSP standards, and
is used in many enterprise applications. Tomcat was first released in 1999 and has
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(b) Using ribbons to isolate heaps of web applications instead of using private class loaders.
Figure 5.8.: Overview of Tomcat ribbonization.
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To use Tomcat, developers package servlets and JSPs as applications into WAR
files, which can then be dynamically deployed or undeployed to or from a running
Tomcat server. Applications deployed as WAR files typically run in complete isolation
from each other. This isolation is enforced in Tomcat through private class loaders
(one per application context) and the Java Security Manager.
Using a private class loader for each context provides strong isolation, but also re-
sults in memory overhead from redundant class metadata for identical classes shared
by distinct web applications. Additionally, private class loaders cause increased
startup costs, due to having to decode, verify, and compile several copies of the
same method instead of just one copy of each unique method.
While memory savings per instance may be relatively minor (e.g., in the MVM
system [33] they found a savings of 5MB-7MB per additional deployed application
for the libraries they studied), these savings can add up significantly considering that
there may be hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of deployed applications on a single
Tomcat server. As individual servers grow increasingly powerful (and can therefore
accomodate more users and deployed apps), the memory and CPU overhead from
duplicate metadata and class compilation becomes increasingly relevant.
To reduce these ine ciencies Tomcat version 5.5.31 was refactored with RibbonJ
to use protection domains to isolate the heaps of deployed web applications and to
use ribbons to enforce this isolation while an application processes a request. The
prototype, TomcatRJ, uses the ribbonized version of JikesRVM for its runtime, and
supports the same features and deployment configurations as the original version of
Tomcat.
5.3.2 Architecture and Coding Overview
The left side of Figure 5.8(a) shows the class loader hierarchy for the unmodified
version of Tomcat. While there are several class loaders in the hierarchy, most are
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used only to isolate sensitive parts of the Tomcat runtime from any shared state and
private application state, and once their initial set of classes are loaded they do not
load many additional classes. The exceptions are the application private class loaders,
of which there can be an arbitrary number, and so the focus of the refactoring e↵orts
were placed on eliminating these class loaders through ribbonization.
The right side of Figure 5.8(a) shows the straightforward division of the Tomcat
heap into protection domains, wherein each application-private class loader is replaced
by an application-private protection domain. Note how only one global protection
domain is used for all of the “fixed” class loaders. Within this global protection
domain the class loaders provide the isolation, and so we do not need to isolate further
using protection domains. Additionally, in the new architecture, classes loaded by
applications are loaded by the Shared class loader, ensuring there is only one copy of
relevant class metadata.
Figure 5.8(b) shows how ribbons are mapped onto the protection domains and also
the domain sharing privileges. All of the threads in the original design of Tomcat
continue to run in the main Tomcat ribbon, termed the daemon ribbon. During the
processing of a request mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the request is
processed within an isolated context. To do this, an additional processing thread
pool is maintained for each deployed application, the request is handed o↵ through a
shared queue for processing on the application-private ribbon, and then the original
request thread waits for the result. Hand-o↵ and waiting is accomplished through
normal Java synchronization primitives.
Tomcat follows the chain-of-responsibility software design pattern for request pro-
cessing. A Pipeline models a sequence of actions required to process a request.
Actions are modeled by Valve objects. This design lends itself quite nicely to rib-
bonization. A new type of Valve was created that o✏oaded requests to a private
processing ribbon and waited for the response. Valve objects are aware of lifecycle,
and so during startup and shutdown the appropriate protection domain, ribbon, and
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thread pool could be constructed or cleaned up, as appropriate. Then if the applica-
tion is configured to use ribbonization for isolation instead of a private class loader, a
ribbonizing Valve would be inserted (at runtime) into the processing Pipeline for
that application.
Note that in this design the architecture of Tomcat’s original request processing
queue did not have to be modified—Tomcat will accept a new connection and perform
application dispatching from within the daemon ribbon, and only once it has been
dispatched to the proper application will it then be redirected to the appropriate
application-specific ribbon. The main challenge in ribbonizing the original thread pool
itself is that we do not know which application needs to process a request until the
request has been partially decoded. Because a thread cannot “switch” to a di↵erent
ribbon, the request must be passed o↵ to a di↵erent thread in the desired ribbon;
we thus require two extra context switches (one to pass o↵ the request, and one to
receive the response once processed). The overhead of this technique is measured in
detail below.
Finally, certain class metadata must not be shared, such as the values of static
fields and the locks of objects, in order to provide the same level of isolation as private
class loaders. In this implementation, bytecode is rewritten to mediate accesses to
static fields and redirect them to ribbon-local values instead of the corresponding
class global field values.
The prototype does not address the redirection of object locking; however, this
could likely be addressed at the VM level by redirecting to a ribbon-local lock for
the object when an object’s lock is promoted to a heavyweight lock. Addition-
ally, the benchmark that was used to evaluate the performance of the prototype
(SPECweb2009) does not make use of locks on isolated objects, so the performance
numbers would not change significantly if locks were fully isolated. The benchmark
was designed to be representative of the designs of modern web applications. In Tom-
cat web applications most shared state is contained in either the session object (which
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is not managed by the application-private class loader), or in a database (which does
not rely on Java object synchronization for concurrency control). Thus, this disser-
tation does not study the impact of fully isolating locks within this refactoring of
Tomcat.
5.3.3 Assessment of Refactoring E↵orts
The refactoring required relatively little coding and was exhibited purely as new
lines of code (no existing lines of code needed to be changed). In total there were
680 new lines of code, most of which were for the implementation of the ribbonizing
Valve. AspectJ was used to write a short yet powerful aspect to redirect static field
accesses to a ribbon-local value cache. Only two of the original Tomcat Java files had
to be changed – 21 lines of code were inserted to check if an application should be
ribbonized, and if so, to insert the ribbonizing Valve into the appropriate Pipeline.
This confirms the results found in Section 5.2 that the complexity required to
ribbonize a program does not depend on program size, but rather how “cleanly” the
heap can be coarsely partitioned at the source level. Tomcat’s heap already had very
clear boundaries of division, which combined with its use of design patterns allowed
for a highly modular implementation of ribbonization.
5.3.4 Performance Evaluation
The Banking workload of the SPECweb20093 benchmark was used to evaluate
the performance of TomcatRJ under realistic workloads. The Banking workload is
modeled after the actual workload and design of a major banking system in Texas.
The benchmark is divided into three tiers: backend, application logic, and static
content. The backend tier is simulated by an Apache FastCGI module written in








Boxplot of Request Latency
Figure 5.9.: Visualization of the observed distributions of request latency within
Tomcat under the SPECweb2009 Banking workload as a boxplot (includes data from
3 runs). The whiskers on the boxplot are plotted at 1.5 IQR, with the diamond
marking the mean.
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Figure 5.10.: Visualization of the CDF of request latency within Tomcat under the
SPECweb2009 Banking workload (includes data from 3 runs).
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Finally, static content such as bank check images are pre-generated and stored on the
filesystem. Tomcat was also used to serve static content.
The benchmark is driven by one or more multithreaded clients, which make re-
quests to the static web and application server, simulating the behavior of actual
users. The benchmark was configured to eliminate any simulated “user think time,”
such that once a response to a request was returned the client would immediately
make another request; this puts a higher than normal load on the web and applica-
tion server as all clients are making requests as fast as possible. The benchmark was
configured to deploy one client running on its own system with a 2.8 GHz Quad-Core
Intel Xeon processor and 8GB of RAM, running OSX 10.5. The client was configured
to spawn 40 concurrent request generating threads. During the benchmark the CPU
on the client system remained under 50%, so the client was not a bottleneck. The
client system was connected to the server system through a single Gigabit switch.
The server system had a 2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon processor and 4GB of
RAM, running x86 Linux kernel 2.6.32-22-generic #36-Ubuntu SMP. Both Tomcat
and the backend simulator were run on the same system. Throughout the benchmark
we observed the backend simulator using less than 5% of the CPU, so it was not a
bottleneck.
Three iterations of the banking workload were executed, each interleaving between
two configurations: first, the unmodified version of JikesRVM (fully optimized build)
running the original Tomcat, and second, the ribbonized version of JikesRVM (fully
optimized build) running TomcatRJ. The SPECweb2009 benchmark strives to main-
tain a constant level of throughput and then measures request latency to determine
if requests were processed within a “good” amount of time, “tolerable” amount of
time, or “unacceptable” amount of time. In all runs all requests were processed in a
“good” amount of time. The benchmark slowly ramps up throughput to the target
throughput, then warms up the server by maintaining the target throughput, and
finally performs the actual benchmark run. Every 10 seconds data is recorded on
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Table 5.1: Summary of data from the evaluation of Tomcat
Tomcat TomcatRJ Di↵erence
Lines of Code 413,972 414,477 +680 lines
New+Modified LOC N/A 680 0.164% of total
Total # of Requests 5,537 5,562 +25
Median Latency 2.97ms 3.60ms +0.63ms
Mean Latency 4.42ms 6.11ms +1.69ms
Latency 99th Percentile 23.5ms 31.5ms +8ms
Latency 99.9th Percentile 51.4ms 259.2ms +207.8ms
the aggregate throughput and average request latency. Additionally, statistics were
collected on the individual processing times of requests within Tomcat. In TomcatRJ
time required to actually process the request itself was recorded as well as the pro-
cessing time including the time to o✏oad the request to another ribbon and wait for
the response to be returned to the calling ribbon. In this way the additional latency
caused by ribbonization could accurately be measured.
Table 5.1 summarizes the key results of the evaluation. Figure 5.9 o↵ers insight
into the di↵erences in request processing latency. From the boxplot, we see that Tom-
catRJ median latency is less than 1ms more than for Tomcat (0.63ms, see Table 5.1).
In both cases, the mean is above the upper quartile (75th percentile), indicating there
are very large outliers on the upper end. The upper quartile stretches farther for Tom-
catRJ, indicating the upper half of the distribution is more evenly distributed, and
thus interruptions in processing time are more likely. Undoubtedly, this extra source
of variation is caused by the extra context switches. In most cases, the extra context
switches happen relatively quickly, but in the TomcatRJ case small delays happen
more frequently, and the duration of rare delays is larger.
From the CDF in Figure 5.10 we can see that for approximately 80% to 85%
of all requests the di↵erence in latency is less than 1ms. However, past this point,
the outliers become more dramatic in TomcatRJ. The 99th and 99.9th percentile for
latency in Table 5.1 provide insights into the di↵erences in these extreme outliers. At
the 99th percentile, the di↵erence is still not so dramatic (8ms longer for TomcatRJ),
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Table 5.2: Summary of additional latency in request processing due to ribbonization
in TomcatRJ
TomcatRJ
Median Add. Latency 0.559ms
Mean Add. Latency 0.988ms
Add. Latency 90th Percentile 1.005ms
Add. Latency 99th Percentile 3.658ms
Add. Latency 99.9th Percentile 47.070ms
Add. Latency 99.99th Percentile 443.7ms
but at the 99.9th percentile, the outlier for TomcatRJ is more than 4 times the outlier
for Tomcat. When the system is under heavy load (having 40 clients making requests
as fast as possible to the server application), it appears that in very rare cases one or
both of the threads processing a request is starved while waiting to be scheduled to
receive the processed result.
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.11 present the observed additional latency caused by rib-
bonization. The additional latency is calculated by taking the request processing time
as observed in the main daemon pool for a thread and subtracting the time it took to
actually process the request on the isolated thread. This can be obtained by having
the final Valve in the Pipeline (which executes on the isolated ribbon) record the
time it takes to process the request just on that thread. The di↵erence thus includes
both the extra time required to pass o↵ a request and the extra time waiting to be
scheduled to receive and process the response.
The interesting observation here is that at the 99th and 99.9th percentile, the
observed additional time required for ribbonization is significantly smaller than the
observed di↵erences in total request processing time. It appears that the increased OS
scheduling queue lengths and increased use of locking when passing objects between
ribbons is causing context switches in general to take longer on average, sometimes
significantly longer due to starvation, and thus increasing the latency of work that
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Figure 5.11.: Visualization of the distribution for the additional time required to
process requests in Tomcat due to ribbonization during SPECweb2009 Banking. The













































































Figure 5.12.: Throughput for each 10-second interval during SPECweb2009 Banking,
averaged over 3 runs. Excludes warmup and rampdown.
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Measured throughput over the life of the workload is shown in Figure 5.12. It is
important to note that despite the increase in latency in TomcatRJ, there is no sta-
tistically significant di↵erence in total throughput. This indicates that the additional
context switch is not causing significant overhead in terms of CPU cycles. This is not
surprising considering that a modern CPU on a modern OS can perform millions of
context switches per second. This result also indicates that the additional logic in the
allocation fast path in the ribbonized version of JikesRVM is not causing significant
overhead for this workload of this benchmark.
Surprisingly, even the same general shape of the throughput graph is similar over
time. We postulate that each benchmark client thread is seeded deterministically,
and that because the throughput of the benchmark is carefully regulated, similar
patterns of throughput over time can be observed even when averaging data points
across several distinct runs.
In conclusion, it was observed that for almost all requests, the cost of ribboniza-
tion was less than 1ms and that total throughput is maintained at previous levels.
However, the additional context switch introduces variation into the total processing
time of a request, such that 1 out of every 1000 requests is expected to experience
an additional delay between 200ms and 550ms and 1 out of every 100 requests is
expected to experience an additional delay of 8ms.
5.4 Apache httpd Ribbonization
This section presents the results of ribbonizing the Apache httpd web server. The
e↵ort required to ribbonize the application is discussed, and performance di↵erences
of the ribbonized version are analyzed.
109
5.4.1 Apache httpd Overview
Apache httpd4 is an open source web server that is widely used across the Inter-
net. The Netcraft May 2012 web server survey found that Apache httpd is the web
server for approximately 65% of the 662 million sites surveyed.5 The popularity of
Apache httpd stems from its flexibility, modularity, simplicity of configuration, and
performance.
Apache httpd version 2.0 and onward follow a fully modular design where nearly
any functionality can be modified or extended or new features added. Modules are
compiled into Apache statically, or they are dynamically loaded at server startup as
described within configuration files. Modules register hooks to extend or modify well-
defined points of “advisement” within the Apache core program. As with Apache
Tomcat, Apache httpd also follows the chain-of-responsibility design pattern, and
allows modules to add input or output “filters” to the IO filter chain, for example to
compress or encrypt data.
Apache httpd can serve both static and dynamic content. Dynamic content can
be served by any script supporting the CGI interface, or through Apache modules
dedicated to generating dynamic content through a specific scripting language (e.g.,
PHP or python).
Apache httpd is designed to be highly portable to nearly any operating system. It
thus abstracts away any OS-specific functionality required to process requests concur-
renty into “Multi-Processing Modules” (MPMs). This abstraction layer also enables
the use of di↵erent multiprocessing techniques best suited for the task at hand, de-
pending on the characteristics a given application and hardware platform. MPMs
implement an interface to (a) create, manage, resize, and destroy a “task pool” of
workers, (b) queue management logic to accept a request and delegate to a ready




cleanup before re-entering the task pool. The two most commonly used MPMs are
prefork and worker.
The preforkMPM uses the fork call to create child processes that enter the task
pool and are each ready to process a request. Each worker is either processing exactly
one active request or is idle waiting for a new request to be received. Performance
is enhanced in that the fork of a process is performed ahead of time (the master
attempts to keep a non-zero number of idle workers available at all times) and thus
the overhead of the fork call does not a↵ect the latency of processing an incoming
request. Shared memory is used to coordinate resources with the master process (such
as the “scoreboard” information), and a shared mutex is used to synchronize which
idle child accepts a new request.
The worker MPM builds on the functionality in the prefork MPM, but uses
multiple worker threads per child process. The main thread of the child process
will listen for and accept new requests just as with the prefork MPM, but rather
than processing the request directly, it delegates a newly received request onto a
child-private job queue. Within each child process a fixed number of worker threads
wait for new requests within the child-private job queue. This MPM thus has the
overhead of an additional queue (and thus point of synchronization) to be traversed
in order to process a request; the motivation of the MPM is that on some platforms
or workloads the benefits of multithreading (e.g., potentially faster context switching)
will outweigh this extra cost. The MPM is configurable and allows constraints over
both the number of child processes as well as the number of threads used within each
child.
Apache httpd uses a “pool” system for tracking system resources, including mem-
ory, sockets, and other OS resources. A pool consists of one or more regions of mem-
ory that are dedicated to a particular purpose within Apache. Almost all memory
allocation and deallocation within Apache httpd are performed using pool alloca-
tion and deallocation functions rather than those provided by the standard C library.
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Additionally, OS resources can be attached to pools so that these OS resources are
guaranteed to be freed when the pool is freed. Pools are hierarchical and can contain
zero or more child pools. When a pool is freed, any child pools (and recursively and
grandchildren pools and so forth) are also freed.
Pools provide resiliency against memory and resource leaks. Although pools do
support explicit deallocation requests for small sections of memory allocated from
within a pool, more typically (especially for the relatively short-lived pools that ded-
icated to request and connection processing) a carefully tested code path frees the
entire pool at the end of its useful lifetime, thus freeing up any associated memory and
OS resources all at once. For example, a pool that is dedicated to resources required
to process a given connection will be freed when all requests on that connection have
been fully processed. This more coarse granularity of resource management results
in fewer code paths potentially leaking data and thus reduces the amount of testing
required to confirm proper functionality.
Gro¨ne et al. [52] provide further information on the software architecture of Apache
httpd, including information on the modules interface and API, the available multi-
tasking server architectures, the request–response loop, and pool-based resource and
memory management.
5.4.2 Ribbonization Overview
Apache httpd is written in the C language. Thus, the ribbonization of Apache
httpd relies solely upon the lower-level ribbons C library. Apache httpd was already
designed so di↵erent logical segments of code allocate from di↵erent types of pools,
which have a hierarchical relationship to each other. This fits well with the protection
domain and ribbons model, allowing di↵erent pools to be logically mapped to di↵er-
ent memory domains, and di↵erent modules of code to run within di↵erent ribbons
(having di↵erent levels of privileges across di↵erent pools/memory domains) without
significant modification. The ribbonization process involved five main changes:
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First, a shared library was implemented that replaces the standard malloc and
free (and related) functions. The new implementations allocate (and free) memory
from an explicitly specified global memory domain rather than the C runtime library’s
managed heap. When a new program starts, this shared library can be loaded first
prior to any other shared library (including the C runtime library) via the use of the
LD_PRELOAD environment variable. In this way, this shared library can override a
program’s use of malloc and free without having to modify the program itself.
Second, logic was added to the main function to initialize the ribbons C library.
Initialization is straightforward as all of the default initialization parameters of the
ribbons C library are used. A global memory domain is then explicitly created and
the customized malloc and free implementations are instructed to use this global
memory domain for all future allocations. Thus, this initialization logic takes place
at the very beginning of the main function before any other code will attempt to call
malloc or free.
Third, the Apache httpd pool allocation and resource tracking system was en-
hanced so that each pool could optionally be associated with a specific memory do-
main. Modifications were limited to the construction of pools (where a memory
domain is optionally specified) and where pools allocate and free memory from the
underlying operating system. Pool allocation was changed to instead rely on the rib-
bons C library to allocate or free memory from the memory domain associated with
a pool. If a memory domain was not specified during pool construction, the pool
uses the memory domain of its parent pool (or the global memory domain if there
is no parent pool). This design allows specification of isolation boundaries (plac-
ing di↵erent pools into di↵erent memory domains) solely by having to modify pool
construction and avoiding modifications to other sections of code that rely on pools.
Fourth, the underlying runtime library that abstracts OS operations that Apache
httpd relies on (the “APR” library) was enhanced to support the creation of ribbons
in addition to just threads. The worker MPM was then modified so that each worker
113
Table 5.3: Summary of code changes required to ribbonize httpd (worker MPM).
httpd-worker httpd-ribbons Di↵erence
Lines of Code 360,875 361,145 +270 lines
New+Modified LOC N/A 283 0.078% of total
New+Modified Files N/A 9 1.020% of total
processing thread is created within the context of its own (isolated) ribbon. The
memory pool associated with each worker processing thread was thus also associated
with the private memory domain associated with the worker thread’s private ribbon.
This ensures that each worker thread is isolated from the actions of other worker
threads through the ribbons mechanism.
Finally, all synchronization primitives (semaphores, condition variables) were mod-
ified to use the appropriate kernel flags so that the Linux kernel implements these
primitives correctly when synchronization is being performed across di↵erent pro-
cesses. This is required because the user-space implementation of the Ribbons C
library implements each ribbon as a separate kernel-level process (while still sharing
the same file resource table), which is the only way to allow each ribbon to indepen-
dently control its virtual address space mapping (without explicit kernel-level support
for ribbons). The Linux kernel uses a slightly slower type of futex when implementing
inter-process synchronization primitives vs. intra-process synchronization primitives,
and this contributes to the runtime overhead observed in the ribbonized version of
Apache httpd.
5.4.3 Assessment of Refactoring E↵orts
The refactoring started with Apache httpd 2.4.2, which has 360,875 lines of code
and 882 source code files. The changes required by ribbonization are summarized in
Table 5.3. The changes were targeted and did not cause “ripple e↵ects” into unrelated
components—only 9 out of 882 files had to be changed, and within these changed files,
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only 10 existing lines of code had to be changed and 3 lines moved. The ribbonization
logic was primarily implemented by 270 lines of additional code added within these
9 changed files. The required changes were quite small because the Apache httpd
software architecture already coarsely partitioned the heap with its pool-based allo-
cation design. This confirms the findings of Section 5.2 and Section 5.3.3 that the
complexity required to ribbonize a program depends on how “cleanly” the heap can
be coarsely partitioned at the source level rather than the program’s overall size or
complexity.
5.4.4 Performance Evaluation
ApacheBench6 is a benchmarking program included with Apache httpd that mea-
sures the request processing latency and throughput of a web server. It initiates a
fixed number of requests (with a configurable level of concurrency) to a given URL
at a specified web server, and then measures the time required to connect, start, and
fully process a request. Apachebench reports timing information only to the nearest
whole millisecond. It also measures throughput in the average number of requests
processed per second.
ApacheBench is initiated from a client system targeting a server system under test.
In these benchmarks, the client was a system with a 2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon
processor and 2GB of RAM, running Linux kernel Ubuntu 2.6.28-16-generic SMP
x86 64. The server system had a 2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon processor and 4GB
of RAM, running x86 Linux kernel 2.6.32-22-generic #36-Ubuntu SMP. The client
and servers systems were connected by a 100 Mbit/sec network (network throughput
was limited to 100 Mbit/sec so that network-bound workloads could be simulated




The level of concurrency was varied over the range (1,2,4,6,8) so as to exercise the
cases when (a) there were fewer concurrent requests active than the number of CPU
cores on the client and server (no CPU contention), (b) there was the same number
of concurrent requests active as the number of CPU cores (all CPU cores should be
close to busy all the time, unless load is network-bound instead of being CPU bound),
and (c) there were more concurrent requests active than the number of CPU cores
(CPU contention for CPU bound workloads).
The latency and throughput were measured for three di↵erent configurations: (a)
unmodified httpd using the prefork MPM, (b) unmodified httpd using the worker
MPM (configured with only one process and the desired number of worker threads),
(c) ribbonized httpd (modified worker MPM configured with only one process and
the desired number of worker ribbons). This allows comparison of the case where
there is only one point of inter-process synchronization (prefork MPM) to a case
where there is one point of inter-process synchronization and one point of intra-process
synchronization (worker MPM) to a case where there are two points of inter-process
synchronization (worker+ribbons MPM).
Additionally, to understand performance under CPU-bound and network-bound
workloads the benchmark was run for three di↵erent sizes of pages: small (45 bytes,
representing a nearly empty html page), average-sized (11.19 KB), and large (1.0
MB, representing a streaming file download workload). The average page size was
computed using data from Google7 that comprises a study of page sizes for the top 380
million websites. The average size was derived by taking the average total document
size for a top website (477.26 KB) and dividing by the average number of GET
requests required to fully load a top website (42.63). The small and average page
size workloads are expected to be CPU-bound and the large page size workload is



























Figure 5.13.: Throughput for httpd under the apachebench workload for small [45
byte] web pages (includes data from 20 runs).
Table 5.4: Summary of latency di↵erences for ribbonized httpd under the apachebench
workload for small [45 byte] web pages.
httpd-worker httpd-ribbons Di↵erence
Median Latency 7ms 7ms 0ms
Mean Latency 7.74ms 8.96ms +1.22ms
Latency 90th Percentile 12ms 16ms +4ms
Latency 99th Percentile 20ms 25ms +5ms
Latency 99.9th Percentile 74ms 64ms -10ms
To ensure statistically meaningful data, 20 runs of data were collected for each
unique configuration (type of httpd, level of concurrency, and page size). Confidence
intervals are given at 99%.
5.4.5 Benchmark Results for Short Pages








Boxplot of httpd (small page) Request Latency
Figure 5.14.: Visualization of the observed distributions of request latency within
httpd under the apachebench workload for small [45 byte] web pages as a boxplot
(includes data from 20 runs each with 5 di↵erent levels of concurrency). The whiskers
on the boxplot are plotted at 1.5 IQR, with the diamond marking the mean.
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Figure 5.15.: Visualization of the CDF of request latency within httpd under the
apachebench workload for small [45 byte] web pages (includes data from 20 runs each
with 5 di↵erent levels of concurrency).
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Throughput results are presented in Figure 5.13. There is no statistically sig-
nificant di↵erence in throughput until the point is reached where there are the same
number of active concurrent requests as the number of CPU cores (4). After this point
the performance of both the worker MPM and the ribbonized worker MPM degrade,
with the ribbonized worker MPM showing more significant performance degradation.
One key di↵erence between the prefork MPM and the worker MPM relevant to this
performance behavior is that the prefork MPM does not require any synchronization
primitives (e.g., mutexes) to coordinate the accepting of new connections between
the di↵erent processes. Instead, the prefork MPM relies on the operating system’s
implementation of the select system call to only wake one of the worker processes
when a new connection is ready to be accepted. In this way, only a single context
switch is required in order to accept a new connection and begin processing.
In contrast, both the unmodified worker MPM and the ribbonized worker MPM
rely on a shared queue and synchronization primitives to coordinate the accepting of
a new connection and then the distribution of this newly accepted connection to a
worker thread (or ribbon) for processing. Thus, the worker MPM requires two con-
text switches (one for the listener thread to accept the new connection and to put the
connection into the shared worker queue, and another context switch for one of the
worker threads or ribbons to take the new connection out of the shared worker queue
for processing) instead of just the one that the prefork MPM requires. Additionally,
the ribbonized worker MPM requires the use of inter -process synchronization prim-
itives rather than intra-process synchronization primitives, which require the use of
a slower type of futex in the Linux kernel (the user-space implementation of ribbons
maps each ribbon onto a separate process–this would not be required by a kernel-level
implementation).
The cost of this extra context switch is hidden when there are more CPU cores
than the number of active concurrent requests, and thus throughput is identical for
these cases. As the level of concurrency matches and then exceeds the number of CPU
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Table 5.5: Summary of latency di↵erences for ribbonized httpd under the apachebench
workload for average-sized [11.2KB] web pages.
httpd-worker httpd-ribbons Di↵erence
Median Latency 12ms 15ms +3ms
Mean Latency 14.13ms 16.05ms +1.92ms
Latency 90th Percentile 22ms 26ms +4ms
Latency 99th Percentile 33ms 36ms +3ms
Latency 99.9th Percentile 139ms 72ms -67ms
cores, the cost of this additional context switch becomes more and more apparent.
Additionally, in the case of ribbons the extra cost of the inter-process futex causes
additional degradation. The additional overheads in accepting a new connection are
the most significant in the case of small web pages because the time required to
actually process the request is much smaller than with the other two cases.
Table 5.4 presents the mean latency and latency at di↵erent percentiles for the
di↵erent versions of httpd.8 Figure 5.14 presents a boxplot of the distribution of
latency for each version of httpd, and Figure 5.15 plots the corresponding CDF of the
distributions. Notably, median latency is identical (within the granularity of 1ms)
and the latency distributions are nearly identical until the 50th percentile. After this,
1-2ms of additional delay can be seen between prefork and worker. The ribbonized
worker adds an additional 1-5ms of latency beyond that of worker. However, for
extreme outliers (the 99.9th percentile) the ribbonized worker is 10ms less than that
of the unmodified worker. It is postulated that the inter-process synchronization futex
has slightly better fair scehduling properties than the intra-process synchronization



























Figure 5.16.: Throughput for httpd under the apachebench workload for average-sized









Boxplot of httpd (average page) Request Latency
Figure 5.17.: Visualization of the observed distributions of request latency within
httpd under the apachebench workload for average-sized [11.2KB] web pages as a
boxplot (includes data from 20 runs each with 5 di↵erent levels of concurrency). The
whiskers on the boxplot are plotted at 1.5 IQR, with the diamond marking the mean.
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Figure 5.18.: Visualization of the CDF of request latency within httpd under the
apachebench workload for average-sized [11.2KB] web pages (includes data from 20
runs each with 5 di↵erent levels of concurrency).
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5.4.6 Benchmark Results for Average-sized Pages
Figures 5.16–5.18 and Table 5.5 present the benchmark results for average-sized
(11.2KB) web pages. The data generally follows the same pattern as in the case for
small web pages. Throughput is statistically equivalent for the cases where there
are more CPU cores than the number of active concurrent requests. Beyond this
point, throughput for worker is slightly worse than for prefork, and even more so for
ribbonized worker. However, in this case overall throughput for ribbonized worker
actually improves when the number of active requests exceeds the number of CPU
cores (the opposite was seen for small web pages). Additionally, the overall decrease
in throughput at the highest concurrency level for ribbonized worker vs unmodified
worker is less for this case (14%) than for small web pages (12.1%).
The general shape of the latency distributions are also quite similar. The latency
distribution for ribbonized worker diverged at an earlier point in this case (37th
percentile vs the 50th percentile) but retains the same relative shape. The data in
this case also shows lower latency at the 99.9th percentile for the ribbonized worker
vs. the unmodified worker.
5.4.7 Benchmark Results for Large Pages
Figures 5.19–5.21 and Table 5.6 present the benchmark results for large (1MB)
web pages. In this case throughput is constrained by the bandwidth of the 100
Mbit/sec interface connecting the client and server machines. This can be seen in
the throughput graph by observing that the speedup at concurrency levels of 6 and
8 requests does not increase compared to the concurrency level of 4 requests (in
contrast to continued increases past 4 concurrent requests for other benchmarks).
Additionally, the theoretical maximum transmission speed of a 100 Mbit/sec interface
using TCP/IPv4 is approximately 11.7 MB/sec (after factoring in protocol overhead
8Data from all runs for all concurrency levels is combined into one data set for each version of httpd
























Figure 5.19.: Throughput for httpd under the apachebench workload for large [1MB]
















Boxplot of httpd (large page) Request Latency
Figure 5.20.: Visualization of the observed distributions of request latency within
httpd under the apachebench workload for large [1MB] web pages as a boxplot (in-
cludes data from 20 runs each with 5 di↵erent levels of concurrency). The whiskers
on the boxplot are plotted at 1.5 IQR, with the diamond marking the mean.
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Figure 5.21.: Visualization of the CDF of request latency within httpd under the
apachebench workload for large [1MB] web pages (includes data from 20 runs each
with 5 di↵erent levels of concurrency).
Table 5.6: Summary of latency di↵erences for ribbonized httpd under the apachebench
workload for large [1MB] web pages.
httpd-worker httpd-ribbons Di↵erence
Median Latency 365ms 368ms +3ms
Mean Latency 373.71ms 378.42ms +4.71ms
Latency 90th Percentile 729ms 741ms +12ms
Latency 99th Percentile 767ms 766ms -1ms
Latency 99.9th Percentile 788ms 772ms -16ms
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for the Ethernet, IP, and TCP layers). Other factors (e.g., line noise, physical interface
design, and driver e ciency) can further reduce maximum throughput. In this case,
throughput peaks at 10.66 MB/sec.
The latency of requests in this case is dominated by the time required to transmit
1MB of data, such that the additional latency required by ribbonized worker (a few
ms) is insignificant compared to the time required to actually transmit the data (at
least 150ms, often much longer for higher concurrency cases). Overall throughput is
thus statistically equivalent for all levels of concurrency and all MPM versions.
The shape of the distributions of latency for the di↵erent MPM versions is dra-
matically di↵erent in this case as well, again because request processing latency is
dominated by the time required to transmit the response data. In the latency CDF
graph in Figure 5.21 the most frequent latency required to transmit response data
at that level of concurrency is clearly visible in the five nearly vertical “jumps” in
the CDF. This demonstrates that the TCP connection for each response is utilizing
approximately the same amount of bandwidth (there is fair sharing of bandwidth),
such that at a given concurrency level (and thus a given amount of bandwidth for
each active request/response) the latency is approximately the same. The amount of
variation for each request for a given level of concurrency increases as the number of
concurrent request increases.
The shape of the CDF is mostly the same for the prefork MPM and the worker
MPM, although the prefork MPM actually lags behind in some but not all level of
concurrency. Again we see the pattern where the shape of the CDF for the ribbonized
worker consistently lags behind the shape of the CDF for worker, due to the increase
connection acceptance latency. The increase in median latency is the same as with
the case for average-sized web pages–3ms. The pattern also continues where the
extreme outlier at the 99.9th percentile has less latency for ribbonized worker than
for worker. This behavior is also observed to a lesser degree at the 99th percentile as
well. Given that requests are dominated by the transmit time in this case, it could
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be that this behavior at the 99th percentile is similar because request latency is more
tightly uniform and the 99th percentile is “similarly extreme” as the 99.9th percentile.
Latency at the 90th percentile (which is near the middle of the observed latency when
the number of concurrent requests is 8) is still increased for the ribbonized worker as
it was for the cases for the small and average-sized web pages.
5.4.8 ApacheBench Results Summary
In all cases, request processing latency between the lower and upper quartiles of the
distribution of latency increased between 1ms–5ms for the ribbonized worker MPM vs
the unmodified worker MPM. In cases where the connection acceptance latency was a
significant portion of the overall request processing latency, this additional overhead
could cause overall throughput to decrease when the benchmark was CPU bound
(i.e., when the number of concurrent requests matched or exceeded the number of
CPU cores and when the data transmit time did not dominate the overall request
processing time). In cases of severe CPU contention (e.g., small web page size and
6 or 8 concurrent requests) overall throughput could decrease significantly (18.9%–
21.7%). In cases with less severe CPU contention the reduction in throughput was
less significant (5.8%–16.5%). In cases without CPU contention in all cases there was
no observed statistically significant di↵erence in overall throughput between worker
and ribbonized worker.
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This dissertation presented Ribbons, a new programming model that provides full
or partial heap isolation. RibbonJ was defined and is a realization of this model
in Java. The formal properties of RibbonJ were explored in RibbonJ-lite. This
dissertation also presented the design and implementation of the RibbonJ compiler,
the enhanced JVM that supports RibbonJ at runtime, and the Linux user-space run-
time that supports the enhanced JVM. This dissertation also evaluated the practical
use of ribbons by “ribbonizing” both large and small applications, by studying the
complexity of these refactorings, and by evaluating the performance characteristics
of the ribbonized versions vs. their corresponding unmodified versions.
6.1 Conclusions
The applicability of ribbons was explored by first refactoring four small applica-
tions to use RibbonJ and then by refactoring two large-scale open-source applications,
Apache Tomcat and Apache httpd. In all of these applications the desired isolation
could be implemented using ribbons without complex or intrusive code changes. It
was found that the complexity required to refactor these applications was related not
to the overall size or complexity of the application itself, but rather to how easily
the existing software architecture could be adapted to coarsely partition the heap
as required in order to achieve the desired isolation properties. In all refactored ap-
plications the new isolation properties could be implemented using ribbons in less
than 1000 lines of code (representing a change of less than 0.2% of the code for the
large Apache applications). While these results do not generalize to all applications,
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it provides evidence that in certain cases large-scale, complex applications can make
use of ribbons without significantly re-engineering the application.
Performance characteristics of ribbons were evaluated through microbenchmarks,
the DaCapo benchmark suite, the SPECweb2009 benchmark, and the ApacheBench
benchmarking tool. The microbenchmark results demonstrated that there was no
additional overhead in memory access operations for a ribbonized heap vs a non-
ribbonized heap. The DaCapo benchmark suite results exhibited mixed results for
the complete RibbonJ runtime stack, with some benchmarks showing no di↵erence
in performance, some showing minor performance decreases (2% to 6%), and a few
cases with more significant overhead (12%). More detailed analysis of the benchmark
results demonstrated that the likely primary cause of the reduction in performance
in these cases was due to the significantly more complex object allocation code path.
For the webserver benchmarks (SPECweb2009 and ApacheBench), in cases where
there was no CPU contention (SPECweb2009 benchmark results and ApacheBench
results where the number of concurrent requests was fewer than the number of CPU
cores) no statistically significant di↵erences in throughput between the ribbonized and
non-ribbonized applications were observed. In cases with CPU contention, through-
put decreased, sometimes significantly (a reduction in throughput of 5.8%–21.7% was
observed). In all webserver benchmarking cases, with or without CPU contention,
ribbonization commonly added between 1ms–5ms to each request: in between the
lower and upper quartiles of the distribution of request processing latency it was ob-
served that ribbonized applications had an additional overhead of 1ms–5ms. Behavior
for extreme outliers (99.9th percentile in the distribution of latency) was application
dependent, where sometimes latency was significantly increased (as was the case with




The most immediate extension of this work would be to implement support for
ribbons within the OS kernel itself, so that ribbons are a first-class construct in the
OS just as are processes and threads. Providing support for ribbons within the OS
kernel would eliminate the need to use slower inter-process synchronization primitives
for inter-ribbon synchronization (instead allowing the use of the intra-process variant
of the futex for inter-ribbon synchronization).
A kernel implementation would allow exploration of how to more e ciently imple-
ment context switching between ribbons within the same process (an “inter-ribbon
context switch”). For example, instead of swapping out the root page table pointer
register during an inter-ribbon context switch, the kernel could instead modify the
existing page table entries (or page directories) to reflect the new allowed view of the
heap. This could be especially e cient when switching between ribbons that have
mostly similar views of the heap. If both inter-ribbon context-switching strategies
were implemented, then new scheduling algorithms could be explored that scheduled
ribbons with similar heap views and memory access patterns onto the same physical
CPU core or socket. This could potentially lead to advancements in scheduling e -
ciency for systems with large numbers of CPU cores, as well as for NUMA systems
that have large numbers of CPU sockets.
Some applications may require more than just heap isolation for safeguarding the
execution of sub-components (e.g., if sub-components need to execute with di↵erent
OS-level privileges or have access to a di↵erent subset of files or other OS resources).
For example, web browsers may desire to execute plugins with highly restricted access
to the local filesystem. Additionally, using distinct processes for isolation can provide
“kill-safety” [44], if designed correctly, and the concept could be extended so that
ribbons could have the “kill-safety” property under certain conditions.
This dissertation focuses solely on isolation of the heap and does not claim to
provide complete isolation of sub-components or kill-safety. Full isolation and kill-
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safety would require additional support for ribbons within the OS kernel that had
defined recovery semantics when an individual ribbon within a process failed or was
killed. This dissertation lays a foundation for such future work by defining the ribbons
programming model and language (including a formal model), and by implementing
and evaluating the mechanisms necessary for heap isolation.
Another avenue of future work is the ability for a thread to dynamically switch
which ribbon it is running within, termed a “security context switch,” and thus dy-
namically switch its permissions to view and modify the heap. If ribbons provided
isolation for other OS resources, then this would allow a thread to completely switch
its “security context.” Such a mechanism could allow for single-threaded applications
to easily employ ribbons isolation mechanisms without having to implement the abil-
ity for isolated components to run within their own dedicated threads. Open questions
on this line of research include how to properly constrain security context switches
to properly enforce security (especially for “upcalls” where a thread switches to a
ribbon with greater privileges than that of its current ribbon), how to model such
constraints within a language that provides ease of use, modularity, and security,
and how to securely implement support for such constraints and the security context
switch itself within the OS kernel.
Many open questions surround how to best model the isolation of non-heap re-
sources using ribbons, how to model and implement security context switches, and
how to allow for the “kill-safety” of individual ribbons running within a process. The
ribbons programming model is envisioned as providing a comprehensive framework
for the e cient isolation of software components at a language, language runtime,
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